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TIME TO STEP UP: MODELING THE AFRICAN
AMERICAN ETHNIVESTOR FOR SELF-HELP
ENTR.EPRENEURSHIP IN URBAN AMERICA
Roger M. Groves*
hen the United States Congress passed legislation in late 2000 to revitalize the
urban core with incentives for equity investors, African Americans were inconspicuously
absent as stakeholders in the enterprise. Subsidies in the form of tax credits were
instead gobbled up by investor groups who developed upscale hotel-convention centers,
high priced condominiums, and symphony orchestra venues that the pre-existing poor
residents could not afford. The focus of this Article is not to blame those investors who
took advantage of the opportunity, though they perverted the purpose of the subsidy.
Rather, this Artide seeks to identify a new substrata of the African American middle
class who can step up to seize the opportunity for the benefit of the low income
residents in the low income communities as the law was designed.
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"I believe the federal government can play a positive role in helping
African Americans achieve the goal of owning their own business ...
We've provided $8 billion in new market tax credits to boost invest-
ment and community development in low income areas."
-President George W Bush1
INTRODUCTION
Approximately $820 million in taxes paid by the American people
have been rather ubiquitously placed in the hands of a federal subsidy
program for investors in low income communities.2 The subsidy is in the
form of a tax credit. The program is entitled the New Markets Tax Credit
("NMTC") initiative.3 Under the program, the tax credit is used to entice
investors to provide equity capital into low income urban and rural areas.
The primary focus of my companion law review article, "The De-
Gentrification of New Markets Tax Credits," was to provide a clarification of
the legislative intent and purposes of the federal tax credit program. The
overall issue concerns how public funds can be more efficiently used for
their stated purpose by amending the existing law to formulate an urban
tax credit policy that prioritizes and effectively implements the goals of
the NMTC program. I have previously asserted that the purposes of
NMTC legislation are to revitalize low income areas for the primary
benefit of low income residents, but that this purpose has been usurped in
part by investors who establish gentrifying projects such as venues for
symphony orchestras, upscale hotel convention center complexes, and
high priced condominiums for the financially well healed who migrate to
urban low income areas.
These projects prioritize the "wants" of the wealthy gentrifiers,
while the NMTC legislation, in design, champions the needs of the exist-
ing low income residents who have suffered the effects of poverty. The
statute requires that the entity most responsible for development of the
project, receiving the equity investment and distributing the tax credit
back to the investors have the "primary mission" of serving low income
1. President George W Bush, Address at the Indiana Black Expo Discussing Educa-
tion, Entrepreneurship, and Home Ownership (July 14, 2005), http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050714-4.html.
2. Community Development Financial Institutions Fund, U.S. Dep't of the Treas-
ury, http://www.cdfifiind.gov/who-we are/about-us.asp.
3. Id.
residents.4 I have termed those gentrifier projects, like those that construct
Residence Inns or Marriott Hotels and convention centers, "Problematic
Purposed Projects" since it is difficult to consider such projects as having a
primary mission of benefiting the low income urban residents.' At most,
this author has urged that those projects transform low income residents
from primary beneficiaries to incidental or residual beneficiaries on a
morphed trickle down economics model.6 As such, gentrifier investors are
using federal subsidies for a purpose inconsistent with the congressional
intent.
This Article contends that an alternative type of investor is more
lik'ely to establish projects consistent with the congressional intent of revi-
talizing the community for its low income residents. That alternative is an
African American substrata of the middle class, which I term the Eth-
nivestor.7 It is past time for such a reconfigured African American middle
class on its own collective volition to be part of the revitalization of the
urban core cities through a revitalization of its own, fostering a reunion of
sorts with low income residents of common ethnicity. The accepted
definition of ethnicity for this Article is "self-identification in a sociopoli-
tical grouping that has both recognized public identity and a
conservationist/activist orientation." 8
Part I of this Article examines the historical development of ethnic
enclaves in the United States, and how ethnic entrepreneurship gave rise
to an ethnic enclave economy that can provide a valuable template for a
4. I.R.C. § 45D (c)(1)(A)(2006). That important entity is termed a "Community
Development Entity" (CDE) under section 45D of the Internal Revenue Code.To qualify
as a CDE, the entity must have the primary mission of "serving, or providing investment
capital for, low-income communities or low-income persons." Id.
5. See Roger M. Groves, The De-Gentrification of New Markets Tax Credits, 8 Fla.Tax
Rev. 40, 40-44 n.6 (2007). Table B contains a chart describing the projects by type, the
total amount of equity contributed by investors and the amount of the tax credits to be
received from the federal government. Id. From reviewing governmental profiles for each
of the 230-plus entities awarded subsidies under the program, I have estimated billions of
dollars in tax credits for the Problematic Purposed Projects. Id. And it is the hope of this
Article that an Ethnivestor is more likely to generate "Properly Purposed Projects," which
are projects consistent with the congressional intent of servicing low income residents (e.g.
charter schools, quality grocery stores and health care facilities, and affordable housing
complexes).
6. See id. (asserting that trickle down tax credits are inefficient and not well de-
signed to make low income residents the primary beneficiaries of the projects). A $100
million hotel complex or $500,000 condominium provides a minuscule residual benefit to
low income residents compared to the gentrified purchaser of the condominium, or the
substantial financial returns to the investors and owners of the hotels.
7. The Ethnivestor is one who incorporates and is motivated by his or her ethnic-
ity in making investment decisions. The characteristics of an Ethnivestor will be detailed
later in the Article.
8. MARGARET D. LECOMPTE & JEAN J. SCHENSUL, DESIGNING & CONDUCTING ETH-
NOGRAPHIC RESEARCH 24 (AltaMira Press 1999).
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modern day Ethnivestor. I maintain the NMTC target communities are
also ethnic enclaves. Part II sets forth the conceptual precepts and then
the Ethnivestor model, including various characteristics and investment
motivations that make an Ethnivestor well suited for a NMTC transac-
tion. Part III applies economic principles to further explore whether the
Ethnivestor model may lead to increased utility for low income residents
and the Ethnivestor in a NMTC transaction beyond that of investor
groups not similarly engaged in social entrepreneurship. Finally, Part IV
applies the theoretical model and provides concrete illustrations of how
the Ethnivestor more efficiently meets the congressional purpose of assist-
ing low income residents without marginalizing them in the process. This
discussion emphasizes the importance of small business modeling that
incorporates the experiences of other ethnic enclave economies. The
NMTC structure and transactional scheme is also explained, followed by
a discussion of how the Ethnivestor can seamlessly operate within that
structure.
1.THE ETHNIVESTOR FOR THE ETHNIC ENCLAVE
One likely challenge to the "Ethnivestor" concept is the rhetorical
question, "What makes you think an African American is motivated any
differently than any other investor whose first priority is to receive an
adequate return to justify the investment?" The short answer is that a
properly configured Ethnivestor should have a different definition of ade-
quate return based on a different risk and reward analysis. Before
addressing that issue, some historical context is first required because the
experience of other immigrants provides valuable lessons and insight for
the formation of the Ethnivestor.
The historically popular notion was that turn-of-the-century immi-
grants would join the mainstream through the generations, and enjoy the
bountiful fruits of America in rough proportion to the extent of assimila-
tion, losing their distinctive group characteristics as a byproduct. 9 There is
now a substantial body of empirical evidence that immigrant upward
mobility has depended instead on not assimilating completely into the
mainstream, but rather, maintaining a common cultural identity that
"compensate[s] for other disadvantages such as racial discrimination or a
lack of sufficient start-up capital."' Past immigrants have utilized their
small businesses as culturally customized schools for future generations of
entrepreneurs and financially independent professionals." Several case
9. See MARILYN HALTER, NEW MIGRANTS IN THE MARKETPLACE 2 (University of
Massachusetts Press 1995).
10. Id.
11. See id. at 9.
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studies in Boston, Massachusetts, a premier modeling site, 12 consistently
found those involved in ethnic enterprises later became owners of busi-
nesses themselves, and that future generations entered the mainstream
through professional occupations as owners rather than paid staff. The
studies revealed Greek entrepreneurs, Soviet Jews, Haitians, and British
West Indians all gaining in economic and social resources as a result of
family enterprises built on ethnic foundations.'3
In the early 1990's, one half of the Miami Florida population was of
Cuban origin, and a study found that there were not just co-ethnic self-
employed owners with ethnically aligned employees, but also "locational
clusters" of ethnic entrepreneurs (e.g. "Little Havana" and concentrated
Cuban business districts). 4 Miami's ethnically Cuban economy was "hy-
perefficient"''  because of its "vertical and horizontal integration,
ethnically sympathetic suppliers and consumers, pooled savings, and
rigged markets."'6 The evolved term for this economic dynamic is the
"ethnic enclave economy" consisting of two components: spacial cluster-
ing in a location and a critical mass of immigrant owned business firms
that employ co-ethnic workers to serve their own ethnic market and the
general population.'
7
Those ethnic immigrants were motivated for entrepreneurship
within an ethnic enclave. By exploring their motivations, can we learn
whether a newly configured African American group can become simi-
larly motivated? An established theory (attributable to Max Weber in
1930, hereinafter the "Weber Theory") is that culturally-based entrepre-
neurship within the enclave is primarily a reaction to exclusion from the• • 18
larger marketplace due to discrimination. That is to say, hostility from a
host country is a driving force encouraging economic solidarity and in-
creased entrepreneurship among the oppressed groups, which becomes a
self-help mechanism for survival and growth. 9 More specific study of the
12. Id. at 5. There have been numerous case studies in Boston, Massachusetts be-
cause of an immigration explosion in the late 1980's resulting in the fifth largest influx of
refugees and seventh largest total immigration increase in the US according to the 1990
census. Id. at 9. Boston was thus diversifying faster than most of America without one
single ethnic group dominating the increase. Id. One study by Ivan Light highlighted the
"multiplier effect" of ethnic entrepreneurship. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 29.
15. The efficiency in the ethnic enclave economy is discussed in greater detail in
the section on Application of Economic Principles.
16. See HALTER, supra note 9, at 30.
17. Id.
18. IvAN LIGHT & CAROLYN ROSENSTEIN, RACE, ETHNICITY, AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP
IN URBAN AMERICA 19 (Aldine Transaction 1995).
19. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 39 (Dover
Publications 2003) (1930) (espousing the theory of the acknowledged founder of entre-
preneurship research, Max Weber). Weber's context in 1930 involved religious oppression
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relationship between ethnicity and entrepreneurship brought a theory of
"Middleman Minorities., 2 0 That is to say, in a capitalist system, a certain
class of minorities becomes a "go-between" group, filling a gap between
21the elite ruling class or host society and the poorer oppressed masses.
They are typically not owners of large capital enterprises. They provided a
conduit or negotiating function, passing goods and service as a broker,
rent collector, labor contractor, distributor or wholesaler from the host
society elite to the masses. The middlemen among African Americans
evolved to our current notion of the "black middle class.,
2
3
Much of the older literature of the African American middle class is
curiously devoid of the self-help contributions of the group. Still, the
most evolved and emerging theoretical framework for racial enterprise in
an oppressive society asserts that the African American experience, though
fraught with some unique challenges, is nonetheless consistent with the
Weber principles and the Middleman model for minorities. They too re-
sponded to racism and oppression by establishing self-help businesses
among German Catholics by Protestants, rather than ethnically based hostilities. Id. In his
words: "National or religious minorities which are in a position of subordination to a
group of rulers are likely, through their voluntary or involuntary exclusion from positions
of political influence, to be driven with peculiar force into economic activity. Their ablest
members seek to satisfy the desire for recognition of their abilities in this field, since there
is no opportunity in the service of the State." Id. His examples include Poles who had a
more rapid advance in Russia than in their own lands of Galicia, Id. Also noted were Hu-
guenots in France under Louis XIV, the Nonconformists and Quakers in England, and
"last but not least," the Jews for two thousand years. Id. The self-help mechanism found
among immigrants is two-fold: (1) a clustering of self employed immigrants often serving
their own ethnic market, and (2) those self employed ethnic entrepreneurs hiring co-
ethnic workers. See HALTER, supra note 9, at 27-28.
20. HALTER, supra note 9, at 27.
21. JOHN SIBLEY BUTLER, ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND SELF-HELP AMONG BLACK AMERI-
CANS 241-43 (State Univ. of N.Y. Press, rev. ed. 2005)(1991). They also incorporate pre-
migration experiences in business that are carried over to the United States and are part of
an economic ethos that leads to the development of an ethnically indefinable middle class.
HALTER, supra note 9, at 104-105.
22. This theory is authored in large part by Edna Bonacich and Jonathan H.Turner.
See Edna Bonacich, A Theory of Middleman Minorities, 38 Am. Soc. REV. 583 (1973). Some
recent examples include Asians in East Africa, Japanese and Cubans in the United States,
and Chinese in Southeast Asia, all of whom developed a Middleman group. Id.
23. While some historians, most notably E. Franklin Frazier, contemptuously viewed
the black middle class as isolating themselves from the working class by building institu-
tions to educate the black bourgeoisie rather than the masses and buttressing the
differences through Greek letter organizations and social clubs, a more recent group has
opined that a wider group of the black middle class may well have demonstrated connec-
tivity with the working class. We just lack the theoretical framework to objectively analyze
their contributions. Compare BUTLER, supra note 21, with E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER, BLACK
BOURGEOISIE (First Free Press Paperbacks 1997)(1957).
[VOL. 13:99
FALL 20071 Time to Step Up 105
which in fact thrived during the years of segregation when they could
not depend on upward mobility from the host society.24
In the case of African Americans, freed slaves in Philadelphia in the
late 1700s developed a critical mass of small businesses to survive eco-
nomically, serving black and white clientele. In the early 1.900s, the
proliferation continued despite the fact that African Americans were
forced to do business primarily with each other for a period after the pas-
sage of Plessey v Ferguson with its separate but equal doctrine in 1899.2 By
1911, when segregation was still in its glory, Atlanta had approximately
26
2,000 black-owned establishments, representing over 100 business types.
This included a bank, 3 insurance companies, 12 drug stores, 60 tailor
27shops, 83 barber shops, and 85 grocery stores. It is important to observe
that this forced self-help entrepreneurship existed 126 years before the
City of Atlanta granted its first government contract to an African Ameri-
28can owned enterprise. In fact, it appears that in 1929, African Americans
were the only ethnic minority group to compile their own national eth-
nically separated retail store census, and they begged the United States
Bureau of Census to do the same. 9
With banking in particular, African Americans were spurred by the
rejection of the hostile host to establish at least 134 banks between 1888
and 1934.30 In contrast with modern times, as of 1986, with principles of
assimilation and integration diluting the African American interdepend-
ence, there were only 39 African American banks, with total assets of only
12.53% of the total from 60 years earlier.31 "[T]welve out of the twenty-
five banks on Black Enterprises Top 100 were founded between 1895 and
1956, or during the days of official segregation."32 And each of the top ten
24. BUTLER, supra note 21, at 263. In his critique of the Frazier theme of failed inte-
gration, Butler said, "if Frazier had understood, as Weber did, the importance of the
relationship between being excluded from a society ... and business activity, he would
have understood that the [African American response and adaptation to America] has been
seen for hundreds of years." Id.
25. See id. at 42 (referencing earlier works ofWE.B. Dubois, The Negro in Business
(1898) and Joseph Pierce, Negro Business and Business Education (1947)). Butler includes the
systematic establishment of social organizations, religious and educational institutions, both
pubic and private. Id. at 276-80. In one case in 1869 freedmen raised over $200,000 for a
schoolhouse and teacher support. Id. at 264.
26. BUTLER, supra note 21, at 318.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 311.
30. See id. at 319 (citing WE.B. Du Bois, ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AMONG
NEGROES 111 (1907)).
31. Id. (citing Martin Fred, Navigating Rough Waters, Buffeted By a Sea Of Econonic
Woes, Black Banks Discover That Their Size Can Be a Liability-Or Their Greatest Asset, Black
Enterprise,June 1988 at 206).
32. Id.
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African American insurance companies was established during this prolif-
eration of self-help entrepreneurship or no later than 1960.3
Obviously, a return to segregation is not advocated, but the eco-
nomic evidence from that era leads to questions: If self-help
entrepreneurship had vitality when African Americans were more directly
forced together, can a model be created for achieving the same result in
the current environment? What role can the NMTC play with ethnic
Middlemen of today? To answer those questions we must describe the
current environment in comparison with the years of forced segregation
and assess which, if any, of the prior economic circumstances have current
applicability.
One benchmark for comparison is the second of two significant mi-
grations of African Americans from the South to the North.34 The first
was during World War I. In the three short years between 1915 and 1917
approximately 400,000 African Americans migrated north.35 World War II
brought the second wave from the South.36 The impact was more pro-
found. Between 1940 and 1950 roughly 2.5 million African Americans
moved to 168 of America's cities from rural environs 7 In the major in-
dustrial cities of the northeast, the influx of African Americans brought a
flight of white Americans.38 As a result of the continued vestiges of racism,
combined with substandard public schools preventing African Americans
the same mobility as non-minorities, the urban "ghetto" became en-
trenched by the 1950's.39 One study in 1963 concluded that while
European immigrant groups experienced decreasing residential segrega-
tion, African Americans still suffered from systematic segregation and
poorer public education. 40 As a result, segregation patterns accelerated
rather than diminished for African Americans in those cities.4 ' In response
to the blighted condition of urban African American communities, gov-
ernment programs established urban renewal projects that not only
rebuilt, but also displaced or removed people from prior locations.42 Thirty
33. Id. (noting particularly the North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Company
founded in 1898, Atlanta Life in 1905, Golden State Mutual Life insurance in 1925 (Los
Angeles), and Booker T. Washington Insurance Company (Birmingham Alabama) in 1932).
34. See BUTLER, supra note 21, at 267.
35. Id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id. That period between 1940 and 1950 saw dramatic white flight from
major northeastern cities. Id. For example, in Newark, New Jersey the African American
population increased by 29,000 while the white population decreased by 20,000. Id.
39. See id. at 267-68.
40. BUTLER, supra note 21, at 268 (citing Karl E. Taeuber & Alma E Taeuber, Is the
Negro an Immigrant Group?, INTEGRATED EDUC., 1963, at 25).
41. Id. Even the racially distinct Japanese in northern cities experienced lessened
rather than increased segregation. Id.
42. Id. at 310.
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percent of African American businesses were also swept away by renewal
projects and never reopened; of those who did, 50 percent failed within
41the first five years.
A myriad of other factors contributed to a continued deterioration
of the urban core and impact the modeling of the modern Ethnivestor.
44Factors include a social disorganization of the black family structure,
and, by the mid-1960's, an exodus of middle class and working class Afri-
can Americans from the inner cities (also termed "core cities") leaving an
underclass with fewer role models.4' As one study found, the African
American middle class had previously been a "social buffer" that could
"deflect the full impact of the prolonged and increasing joblessness that
plagued inner-city neighborhoods in the 1970's and 1980's., 46 The void
created a higher concentration of desperation among the remaining urban
core residents .
Another current challenge to self-help entrepreneurship among Af-
rican American entrepreneurs involves the lack of sustained educational
institution-building. Unlike the experience of the segregated South, the
migration north did not lead to the re-creation of historic African Ameri-
can institutions. Those institutions provided historical nurturing and
served as launching pads to adapt to and more fully participate economi-
cally in larger American society.48 Without that tradition, Butler
rhetorically asks, "What are the lessons and values passed on from former
generations? ... What are the lessons or values which guide the offspring
of the [African American Middleman]? '49 And unlike the modern ethnic
enclaves, Butler opines that African American enterprise was at one time
the "very center of communities during the days of segregation" and
43. ARTHUR I. BLAUSTEIN & GEOFFREY FAUX, THE STAR-SPANGLED HUSTLE 71 (Dou-
bleday 1972), cited in BUTLER, supra note 21, at 310.
44. See DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION
12 (1965), cited in BUTLER, supra note 21, at 269. As a caution against blaming the victim,
one student of criminology stated: "Treating changing African American family structure
as a causal agent within a vacuum raises an important problem. One cannot assume that all
else in society remained constant while black families and juvenile crime rates changed. In
fact, as noted below, societal change has influenced family structure and, in turn, crime
rates. Directing policy at lower-class African American family structures without address-
ing the larger forces shaping that structure treats symptoms rather than causes." Joseph E
Sheley, Structural Influences on the Problem of Race, Crime, and Criminal Justice Discrimination,
67 TUL. L. REV. 2273,2280--81 (1993).
45. BUTLER, supra note 21, at 269.
46. Id. (quoting WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED 56 (The Univ. of
Chicago Press 1987)).
47. Id. at 251.
48. Id. at 271.
49. Id. at 270.
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"there was always a reality that business enterprise ... was the shoulders
on which to build for future generations.""
Another challenge to returning to earlier self-help mechanisms is
the current pattern of disproportionate consumer spending and the lack
of wealth accumulation. African Americans make up about 12% of the
population, and comprise over $631 billion in annual earnings. However,
only 50% of African American adults own their own homes, while 70% of
white Americans own theirs." Approximately "30% of the African Ameri-
cans that earn $100,000 a year had less than $5,000 in retirement
savings. '5 2 When white and black households were compared, whites
saved almost 20% more each month for retirement.
3
Perhaps most fundamentally challenging for the modern African
American investor is identity ambivalence, the struggle to define oneself
contextually both externally among white America, and then internally
amongst other African Americans. Externally, a common race practice
involves a minority group member presenting oneself differently in front
of a majority white audience than when amongst members of one's own
group. 4 An evolving model, which is both internal and external in estab-
lishing norms for African Americans, is that of a re-defined notion of
"opportunity" beyond "the civil rights legacy of equality of opportu-
nity."'s5 "Opportunity is a concept of enablement rather than possession; it
refers to doing more than having."5' 6 In the NMTC context, the well-
suited African American investor must view the opportunity to invest as
enabling him or her to achieve goals beyond pecuniary gain (a position).
The goal is to invest in a re-invented social entrepreneurial way akin to
African Americans during periods of earlier ethnic enclaves. At the core is
an issue of self-identification and solidarity. If a group is not self-
identified, it cannot achieve solidarity on the issues otherwise thought to
be common. One could ask whether skin color alone is the primary
source of self identification and solidarity among African Americans. Per-
haps there are some African Americans who claim skin color is of no
50. Id. at 311. See also WE.B. Du Bois, Conference at Atlanta University:The Negro
in Business (Mar. 30-31, 1899).
51. Marc H. Morial, The State of Black America: The Complexity of Black Progress, 2004
THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 12 (2004).
52. Yolanda Young, Tough Choice for Tough Times, U.S.A. TODAY, Apr. 2, 2004, at 9A
(citing The Ariel Mutual Funds/Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., Black Investor Survey: Saving
and Investing Among High Income African American and White Americans,June 2003).
53. See id.
54. See John 0. Calmore, Whiteness: Some Critical Perspectives: Whiteness as Audition
and Blackness as Performance: Status Protest from the Margin, 18 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 99, 109
(2005). Calmore called the process one of "re-interpretation, re-invention, re-presentment,
and re-definition of one's racialized identity" Id. A colloquial term is "code-switching."
55. Id. at 109-10.
56. Id. at 110 (quoting IrIs M.YOUNG,JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 26
(Princeton Univ. Press 1990).
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relevance in the current American society because by and large discrimi-
nation based on race is no longer prevalent - hence there is no need for
self identification and solidarity based on skin color. But other scholars
note a "putative solidarity" among some African Americans based on how
the host society has discriminated against a group based in part on race
and skin color, regardless of the variations in skin tones.5" This "putative
solidarity" among African Americans is viewed by leading scholars in the
field as requiring a recognition that although African Americans are a mo-
saic in skin tones and ethnic origins, in this country there is a need for an
overarching common identity, in part because adverse consequences still
flow from being identified as part of that group." In the context of this
Article, only those who have such a self-identification are deemed likely
to be appropriate investors in the MNTC transaction. Ethnographers en-
graft the putative solidarity concept in their scientific studies, defining
ethnicity as incorporating "self-identification in a sociopolitical grouping
that has both recognized public identity and a conservationist/activist ori-
entation."-9
Having laid bare some of the deepened adverse circumstances for
African American-based entrepreneurship in our core cities, the next
question is what characteristics are required from the African American
Middleman of today to achieve that rekindled entrepreneurial spirit for
investing in the current urban core? There are certainly some who assert
that no such motivation exists, but to conclude that a whole segment of
America is monolithic in investment behavior would be too broad sweep-
ing of a conclusion. As this Article will discuss in detail, there is a method
of modeling for certain behavioral characteristics that can match investing
with social causes, with ethnicity and cultural connectivity as a compo-
nent of the investment strategy. Many immigrant groups have entered
America and risen beyond the bottom rung of society based in large part
on such commonalities. 60 History can and often does repeat itself, and
certain lessons from other ethnic economies can be incorporated into the
model for the envisioned Ethnivestor in an NMTC transaction. The
intent is to rekindle the entrepreneurial spirit that existed when forced
self-help circumstances fostered interdependence and solidarity within the
core cities without marginalizing the core people in the process.
57. See Calmore, supra note 54, at 110.
58. Id.
59. LECOMPTE, supra note 8, at 24.
60. See BUTLER, supra note 21, at 31. Butler states that 21.2% of the "Cuban enclave"
of refugees in Miami, Florida commenced their own businesses between arrival in 1973
and 1979. Id.
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II. ETHNIVESTOR CRITERIA
Regarding Ethnivestor criteria, there are three cornerstone precepts
that lay a foundation for the more specific modeling discussed thereafter:
(1) one's perception of risk, (2) the degree to which social entrepreneur-
ship is part of the risk analysis, and (3) an Ethnivestor's access to
investment capital.
A. Risk Analysis
Established literature asserts that at the core of risk analysis is culture
and cultural perceptions. 6' According to leading theorist, Mary Douglas,
"anything whatsoever that is perceived at all must pass by perceptual con-
trols. In the sifting process something is admitted, something rejected and
something supplemented to make the event cognizable.' 62 She concludes,
"The process is largely cultural. ' 3 Over two decades ago, Douglas devel-
oped a paradigm of cultural constraints, fitting behaviors and outcomes
into a grid with groups designated therein.64 Her intention was to develop
a way of identifying and categorizing the causes for the "self-sustaining
perceptual blinkers" and biases we all have, which give rise to how we
perceive our environment and our role within it.
6
5
Investing too is based on perception including, but not limited to,
the perception of risk before one's money is spent. The typical investor is
attempting to increase her economic well-being as a primary motivation
for the endeavor-using her money to make more money. With that
quest in mind, she prudently compares one opportunity for making
money with other opportunities before deciding which vehicle best suits
her. That decision requires a risk analysis-what level of risk of losing my
money am I willing to take in my quest for more money? If the perceived
risk is less for those culturally connected with the community in which
the business operates, the culturally connected investor is more likely to
make the investment than one who is not culturally connected, and thus
perceives that same investment as a higher risk. Someone accustomed to
driving in a major city may be more willing, for example, to bear the risk
of an accident on the very busy Beltway around Washington DC than a
visitor from rural Wyoming who has never driven on the Beltway. The
Wyoming driver is predictably more likely to say, "no thank you" to that
61. See ESSAYS IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF PERCEPTION 1-2 (Mary Douglas ed. 1982). As
will be discussed below, African American entrepreneurs must incorporate risk in making
investment decisions, and that risk component has cultural aspects.
62. Id. at 1.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 1-2.
65. Id. at 2.
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degree of risk. Why? The perception of risk and the familiarity with the
environment is different; the culture is different. Similarly, an investor who
is unaccustomed to the experience of the existing urban core housing or
commercial market is, like the Wyoming driver, likely to perceive the risk
as higher than the urban businessperson or one who is culturally con-
nected with that urban core.
Another major risk variable with important implications for the
NMTC investor is how long the investor must wait (i.e. the holding pe-
riod) before the anticipated return is achieved. From a pure finance
perspective, this author opines that the longer the wait on the return, the
larger the required amount of the return and often the more risky the
investment. The NMTC program has attracted investors over the short
term (i.e. over the 7-year tax credit period).66 The NMTC statute does
not require an investor to commit resources beyond that period, even if a
longer commitment is in the long term interests of the community or the
remaining economic life of the subsidized assets.67 It appears to this author
that a typically motivated investor may consider a commitment beyond
the 7 years of the tax credit to be a greater risk because the tax credit will
no longer compensate the investor for taking that risk. The point is that
investment criteria for an Ethnivestor should include a longer term com-
mitment because it is in the interests of the target community and more
aligned with the purpose of the NMTC program. It is therefore a more
mature model to engage as NMTC investors those who (perhaps atypi-
cally) perceive the low income urban core communities as less of a long
term risk, or at least a risk that for cultural and non-economic reasons, he
or she is willing to take beyond the seven year tax credit haven.
B. Social Entrepreneurship
Equally important, the economic return may not be as high a prior-
ity if the investor's goal is to achieve a blend of economic returns and
social benefits to the target community. This incorporates the burgeoning
study of "social entrepreneurship.' '69 This term is defined as the pursuit of
innovative investment strategies, including profit-making ventures, to
serve a social mission typically found in the nonprofit sector or within
private hybrid business organizations mixing nonprofit and for-profit
66. See I.R.C. § 45D(a)(3)(A)(B) (West 2006).
67. Id.
68. As stated by the US Department of Treasury, the NMTC investments "will be
expected to result in the creation of jobs and the material improvement in the lives of
residents of low-income communities." I.R.S. News Release IR-X (Mar. 14, 2003),
http://www.cdfifund.gov/news/pdf/pr2003_news_03142003.pdf
69. See Gail A. Lasprogata & Marya N. Cotton, Contemplating 'Enterprise': The Busi-
ness and Legal Challenges of Social Entrepreneurship. 41 AM. Bus. LJ. 67, 69 (2003) (asserting
that the investors well suited for NMTC investments are social entrepreneurs).
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social purposes. 70 This is a "double bottom line."' 7' The Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation applies the concept in controlling approximately $60
billion toward its own charitable enterprises . The Foundation's underly-
ing goal is "improving the lot of [the world's poor] without regard to
their color, religion or other differences., 73 Its results-oriented approach
led to the selection of projects they could actually envision making a
meaningful change in the world, such as improving global health through
research, "prevention and treatment for AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and
vaccine-preventable childhood diseases.''74
Modifying a venture capital model, the Gates Foundation leverages
its investments to achieve that double bottom line.75 Its concept is to
identify measurable and achievable outcomes, which though they may
require a large initial outlay of capital, can produce a desired result with a
low cost of sustaining the benefit.76 Like software, the up front costs of
vaccinations globally are very high, but the ongoing manufacturing costs
are low. The Gates observed that three million children a year were dying
from vaccine-preventable diseases. According to the World Health Or-
ganization, the foundation has saved 670,000 children, "and will save
millions more in coming years." 77 The true genesis of this social entrepre-
neurship model was the Gates' mindset to be "audacious" where they
"believe these things actually can be solved.,
78
It is that type of audaciousness that is required for an Ethnivestor
model to effectively make a difference in the urban core communities.
Bill Gates urged his foundation staff to think "outside the box.- 79 As will
be discussed under the specific Ethnivestor model, the qualified investor
must have a similar perspective to avoid the rigidity of externalities and
be guided more by the group's greater good.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. So impressed was the world's second wealthiest man,Warren Buffett (Chairman,
Berkshire Hathaway, Inc), with the social entrepreneurship of the world's wealthiest man,
Bill Gates, that he donated $31 million to the Bill and Melinda Gates foundation, which
previously had assets of an approximately equal amount. Donald G. McNeil Jr. & Rick
Lyman, Buffett's Billions WillAid Fight Against Disease, N.Y.TIMES,June 27, 2006, at Al.
73. Id.
74. Susan Stamberg & Steve Inskeep, Morning Edition: Gates Aims for Major Philan-
thropic Impact (National Public Radio June 27, 2006), available at http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyld=5514403.
75. See id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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C. Access to Capital
Finally, it is of little value to discuss a model for investors if it in-
cludes those with little or no money to invest. African Americans have
$631 billion dollars in earnings per year.8° And there are a few with gorilla
wealth. To name a few, Usher Raymond IV, known worldwide musically
in the rap genre as "Usher," established his own record company (Sony
BMG) that paid him $20 million in 12 years.8' In early 2005 he earned
another $20 million from his 64-city tour. 2 Usher asserts that only 10%
of his income is devoted to consumer spending, with the remainder in-
vested in "fixed income investments, blue-chip stocks, and real estate.,
83
Included in the portfolio is a $1 million investment in a bank. 4 In Febru-
ary 2005 he became a minority owner of the Cleveland Cavaliers of the
National Basketball Association with a $9 million investment. 5 In his
words, "wealth accumulation is at the top of the list.,8 6 Rapper Jay Z
(a.k.a. Shawn Carter) co-owns Rocawear clothing, with $350 million in
sales.8 There are more African Americans in America than there are peo-
ple in Canada,88 and census data reveals a 46% increase in African
American owned firms between 1987 and 1992 compared to a 26% in-
crease in the larger society.89 The opportunity for investment in the
NMTC program and other vehicles is within reach if the collective vision
of a few extends to grasp it.
D. Specific Model
A host of influences affects economic investment goals and choices.
Akin to the Douglas model, this Article urges that there are essentially
two dimensions of control over an individual's decision making. One
80. Young, supra note 52, at 9A.
81. Brett Pulley, Diamonds, Cars and Confessions, FORBES, May 9,2005, at 95.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 96.
84. Id. at 98.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 96.
87. id.
88. According to the US Census Bureau, there were 36.4 million African Americans
(12.9%) within the US population as of April 1, 2000. JESSE McKINNON, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, THE BLACK POPULATION: 2000, CENSUS 2000 BRIEF (2001),
http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-5.pdf. According to Canada's census
agency, Canada had an estimated population of 32,270,500 in 2005. STATISTICS CANADA,
POPULATION BY YEAR, BY PROVINCE AM TERRITORY, (last modified May 29, 2006),
http://www40.statcan.ca/101/cst0l/demo02.htm.
89. BUTLER, supra note 21, at 325. The raw numbers for the African American
owned firms are from 424,165 to 620,912. Id.
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influence module is the impact of forces outside oneself and outside of
the small group of common believers. These are major principalities such
as the government, corporations, and the larger institutional entities that
regulate us in one fashion or another. We must have driver's licenses, car
notes, mortgages regulated by financial institutions, and employers who
regulate employee behavior for assigned tasks. These are termed "External
Regulators." As the chart below depicts, the lower left corner is the low
level of influence by the External Regulators on a person. As the influ-
ence grows, that growth is measured vertically so the top left of the square
reflects the highest extent of external regulation.
The other influence module is the group dynamic where people
have commonalities in areas they consider important. The group has a
self-defined pattern of allegiance, criteria for admission, and varying levels
of commitment to that group. 9° For African Americans, indicia of mem-
bership as a general group include the shared historical context of slavery
and segregation, cultural aspects that are either self-defining (e.g. speech,
music, phrases of art), or ascribed to them in stereotypes that they com-
monly rail against, and of course skin pigment. For the specific purpose of
the NMTC investing analysis, the group influence is defined more par-
ticularly as that group of investors that are self motivated with a non-
traditional sense of social entrepreneurship where the investment goal is
not only to make money as an individual, but as importantly, to be com-
mitted to the betterment of the ethnic enclaves of the NMTC target
community. The group dynamic is therefore the "Ethnivestor" factor be-
cause of the role ethnicity plays in the investment analysis. 91 The extent of
influence of this group factor is increased horizontally from left to right.
So the greater the extent of influence by the group on the individual, the
further to the right that person falls.
From this initial construct, the range of interaction among these in-
fluence factors can be illustrated through four categories, depicted as
boxes within quadrants on a grid.The grid is shown below.
90. Douglas, supra note 61, at 2.
91. The Douglas model used generic terms as part of the notion that the theory is
applicable to innumerable circumstances. Id. at 4-5. She termed the E.I.I. influence as a
"Grid," and the Ethnivestor Group as "Group." Id. at 4. Douglas asserts that this
grid/group theory "predicts or explains which intellectual strategies are useful for survival
in a particular pattern of social relations." Id. at 7. As applied to this publication, the social
patterns for NMTC investors and the intellectual strategies sought to be explained are for
those investors with allegiance to the NMTC purpose of assisting the low income resi-
dents of urban America.
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"Ethnivestor" Group Commitment and Influence Grows
(Low) > (High)
(Low) (High)
1. Group A:The Economically Self Saturated
Investor Group A, at the bottom left corner, represents those with
the least amount of influence from any group dynamic, be it external
regulators (low vertically in the grid) or a common internal ethnic group
influence (horizontally low at the lower left of the grid). Accordingly,
Group A is highly individualistic, being without a significant influence
from any group.They are less inclined to follow the group perspective and
[intentionally left blank]
0-
-J
Economically Stunted Economically Satisfied
Through Subrogation Through
(B) Structural Success
(c)
Economically Self Economically
Saturated - Searching Ethnivestor
Individualism (A) (D)
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prefer to "do their own thing." They are "saturated" by their individualis-
tic goals, or simply put "self saturated." There is little room left to absorb
the social entrepreneurial spirit to sacrifice profits for people. They are less
likely to donate significantly to the NAACP or similar entities unless a
corresponding personal benefit (return on investment) appears likely.
Similarly, these persons are less likely to make personal sacrifices for, and
would therefore have less tolerance for the working class masses as em-
ployees in a small business under a NMTC project. Saliently, this category
of investor is least likely to have the Weber-modeled self-help ethnic
group solidarity for entrepreneurship in response to a hostile societal host.
That self-help model brought the most successful periods of entrepreneu-
rial success by African Americans in this country. For these reasons, Group
A persons among the African American middle class do not meet the
Ethnivestor criteria and are not the ideal candidates for the transactional
92entities on NMTC projects.
2. Group B:The Economically Stunted Through Subrogation
Group B from the African American middle class has high controls
from external sources, (vertically high in the grid) but minimal influence
from the ethnically inspired self-help group (horizontally low-i.e. on the
left of the grid). What prevents Group B from investing in Properly Pur-
posed Projects is some source external to the investor that has a high level
of influence over investment decisions. For example, a career military per-
son may be so ensconced in the culture of military thinking that his only
investment comfort is from whatever is available through the federal gov-
ernment's Department of Defense. There is an ability to invest, but an
inability or unwillingness to go beyond what the external regulators pro-
scribe.
A more blurred line of demarcation, and thus more deserving area
of discussion, is where the external and internal influences are mixed.
There have been external influences such as financial parasites or even
92. The parties to the NMTC transaction are the CDE, the QCB, and the investor.
I.R.C. § 45D(c)(1)(A) (West 2006). The CDE is the statutorily defined "community de-
velopment entity". Id. That entity is certified by the federal government's CDFI as
described supra, at note 4. The CDE receives an equity investment from the taxpayer inves-
tor, and then distributes the investment to the qualified small business within the low
income community. I.R.C. § 45D(a)(1) (West 2006). The QCB refers to the statutory
term: "qualified active low-income community business." I.R.C. § 45D(d)(2)(A) (West
2006). This is the small business from within the low income community that receives a
"qualified low-income community investment," including capital, equity or loans from the
CDE. I.R.C. § 45D(d)(1)(A) (West 2006). The investor is the taxpayer that provides an
equity investment into the NMTC program, for use by the CDE, who in turn provides
the investment to the QCB. I.R.C. § 45D(a)(1) (West 2006).The investor is also the party
that receives the tax credit. Id. This Article asserts that it is past time for more ethnically-
inspired taxpayers to become tax credit investors under this program.
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legitimate financial firms that have led to oppressive debt obligations on
African American investors.93 Once the oppression is internalized (i.e. a
secondary self subrogation), the debt leads to such a level of apprehension
and discomfort that they become gun-shy and fail to invest in Properly
Purposed Projects. This author maintains that inexperience or past finan-
cial failures are causes of that stunted investment perspective in
conjunction with the lack of ethnic influence.
For example, the apprehensiveness about investing in securities has
been tied to several factors, including less exposure to capital markets, in-
experience, and less disposable income which results in a more risk averse
investment strategy.9 4 More particularly, African Americans are among sev-
eral ethnic groups who have been the target of "affinity fraud" schemes,
where crafty sales pitches of nefarious wrongdoers consciously target eth-
nic groups that lack investment experience and appeal to their cultural
values and beliefs. 9 As a result, the Securities and Exchange Commission
has pursued prosecutions for millions of dollars scammed. 6 These scams
account for more than $2 billion in losses over a recent three year pe-
riod.97 African Americans, among others, also have fallen prey to "Ponzi"
schemes which promise investors high rates of return, only to find that
the funds were used to simply pay earlier investors.98 Subprime lending
has also contributed to this investment malaise. Upper and middle income
African Americans are twice as likely as low-income Caucasians to turn
to subprime refinancings in the real estate market.9 9 The lack of investing
93. Isaac C. Hunt, A Message on Investing, 42 How. L.J. 387 (1999).This Article con-
tends that those causes for apprehension also affect the investment risk analysis for other
investments such as real estate. See supra, Part IIA.
94. Hunt, supra note 93, at 388.
95. Lisa M. Fairfax, The Thin Line Between Love and Hate: Why Affinity-Based Securities
and Investment Fraud Constitutes A Hate Crime, 36 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1073, 1074 (2003)
[hereinafter Fairfax, Thin Line].
96. Lisa M. Fairfax, "With Friends Like These ... "Toward a More Efficacious Response to
Affinity-Based Securities and Investment Fraud, 36 GA. L. REv.63, 74 (2001) [hereinafter Fair-
fax, "With Friends Like These"]. Fairfax notes that the SEC obtained a $4 million
disgorgement order against a schemer who targeted almost two thousand African Ameri-
can investors (The "Zurich scheme"). Id. at 74. A similar action was brought against
Hispanics who fraudulently raised $1.5 million from over 200 members of the Houston
Hispanic community. Id. at 74-75. Immigrants from the Dominican Republic, people of
Middle Eastern descent and German speaking Europeans were similarly targeted. Id. at 75.
See also Hunt, supra note 93, at 389 (citing Liz Skinner, Affinity Fraud Scams Increasing,
Hous. CHRON., Apr. 5, 1998, at 2.)
97. Fairfax, Thin Line, supra note 95, at 1086.
98. Hunt, supra note 93, at 389.
99. Baher Azmy, Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle: A Case for States as Laboratories
of Experimentation, 57 FLA. L. REV. 295,328-29 (2005).There is a disproportionate amount
of subprime lending in African American communities, evidenced by a HUD analysis that
over half of all mortgages in those communities were subprine, leaving a Black borrower
five times more likely than white Americans to receive such a disadvantageous loan. Id.
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acumen has also left many African American middle class uncomfortable
with their ability to manage debt.'06 Similarly, a significant part of the Af-
rican American middle class has income, but has yet to invest. Despite the
collective $671 billion in annual earnings, and the 100,000-plus African
Americans that make over $200,000 per year, much is squandered in con-
sumer spending.101 The 2002 median wealth for black households was
$5,988 per year, which is "paltry" since it includes homes, retirements, and
investment portfolios. 10 Some 30% of African Americans earning
$100,000 annually have retirement savings of below $5,000. 103 The first
comprehensive estimate of African American stock ownership revealed
that of the net wealth accumulated by African Americans, only .09 per-
cent was in corporate stocks.10 4 These figures suggest that many African
Americans may currently fall into Group B investors and have not
reached the investment maturity well suited for a NMTC project, though
sufficient income exists. Such investors, already reeling from a history of
bad investments or otherwise uncomfortable with investing, are likely to
perceive a Properly Purposed Project as a high risk and view it with great
suspicion. For some, those prior failures may be so internalized that the
fear of failure stunts any future investment activity that may be considered
risky. The result is that the actor can become unduly passive, dooming
himself to inaction.105
This "what's the use?" attitude has been empirically shown in uni-
versity student testing where three groups were subjected to two tests."
The first test concerned the ability to turn off loud noises. '°7 One group
could control the noise through a lever, another group could not control
the noise at all, and a third group had no noise at all. ' The second test
was to place them in settings where a simple act could eliminate the
100. T.John Simons, Even Amid Boom Times, Some Insecurities Die Hard - Black Middle
Class Gains Ground, But Still Finds Its Situation Shaky, WALL ST.J., Dec. 10, 1998, at A10.
101. Keith Reed, State of Black America, Part Two: Our Financial InsecurityJan. 13, 2005,
http://www.blackamericaweb.com/site.aspx/bawnews/sobapart2.
102. Id.
103. SeeYoung, supra note 52.
104. Andrew F Brimmer, Income, Wealth, and Investment Behavior in the Black Commu-
nity, 78 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PRO.) 2, 154 (1998). This is not to say that African
Americans are doomed to investment failure. There are numerous encouraging signs, in-
cluding the fact that African Americans are making more money than ever before and
overall earning power is rising. See Hunt, supra note 93, at 390.
105. See George G.Triantis, Debt Financing and Motivation, 31 U. RICH. L. Ray. 1323,
1337 (1997) (citing CHRISTOPHER PETERSON ErT AL., LER.NDI HELPLESSNESS: A THEORY FOR
THE AGE OF PERSONAL CONTROL 228-29 (1993)); Lyn Y Abramson et al., Learned Helpless-
ness in Humans: Critique and Reformulation, 87 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 49, (1978).
106. Abramson, supra note 105.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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noise.'") The group that had the inability to control the noise at all in the
first test was the most passive in the second test, even though it could
have very easily accomplished the task."" Similarly applied to this Article,
bad investment experiences or an otherwise skittish investment perspec-
tive can lead to internal doubt, which in turn leads to a lack of effort to
meet the demands of the situation.This leads an individual to believe that
he cannot control the circumstances and he then unduly generalizes that
failure to new situations. The NMTC opportunity would be one such
new situation.The profile of the Group B investor is one already discon-
nected from the ethnic common group, and therefore unlikely to heed
the call for entrepreneurial spirit for the cause of the ethnic enclave. This
investor type wallows in a pity party and self loathing, stunted from in-
vesting in such Properly Purposed Projects. Hence, Group B investors
would not meet the Ethnivestor criteria.
3. Group C:The Economically Satisfied Through Structural Success
This group is identified as having high external regulators (vertically
high in the grid), and high internal ethnicity influence (horizontally far to
the right). The group is more likely than Group A or Group B to meet
Ethnivestor criteria because of a higher affinity with the ethnic group
influence. However, the group is less than ideal for Ethnivestor status be-
cause its investment goals have already been satisfied. Accordingly, they no
longer have an appetite for additional investment, at least of the type to be
found in Properly Purposed Projects under the NMTC program. To illus-
trate the typology, this group may include those who have already
provided equity capital to Properly Purposed Projects in target communi-
ties. A Group C investor may have already established and funded
endowments for that community.
The group could also include the corporate executive that has the
house, automobile, and luxuries of choice, and has contributed signifi-
cantly to both the NAACP and the country club. By way of example only,
there are a few African American CEOs and approximately 275 senior
executives of Fortune 500 companies.' And, as previously noted, over
100,000 African Americans earn more than $200,000 annually. Apart from
possibly a few high cost of living cities, for such folks, the living is easy
financially speaking. These are well healed people by any standard. Some
109. Id.
110. See Triantis, supra note 105, at 1337 (citing D.S. Hiroto, Locus of control and
Learned Helplessness, 102 J. EXPERIMENTAL PsYcro. 187, 187-93 (1974) (defining the char-
acteristics of learned helplessness)). See also id. at 1336 (citing Edwin A. Locke & Gary P.
Latham, Work Motivation: The High Performance Cycle, in WORK MOTIVATION 3 (U Klein-
beck, et al. eds. 1990)).
111. Cora Daniels, Most Powerful Black Executives, FORTUNE, July 22, 2002,
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune-archives/2002/07/22/326294/index.htm.
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of them may be satisfied just where they are, enjoying a peaceful relatively
risk free existence after earning every penny and investing consistent with
their social mission along the way.
So while Group B is unable to invest, and Group A is unwilling to
invest, this group is ethnically influenced, but has concluded that its ethni-
cally inspired investment mission has been accomplished.1 2
4. Group D:The Economically Searching Ethnivestor
This group is the most likely NMTC Ethnivestor because it has in-
dividuals with the highest level of motivation to invest based on ethnic
solidarity akin to the Middlemen from prior generations (horizontally
high on the far right of the grid), yet the lowest interference or dilution
of that motivation by external regulators and influences (vertically low at
the far left of the grid). Thus, corporate or governmental constraints, or
even such traditional investment vehicles that abhor high risk ventures,
would not likely stunt the potential ethnically-inspired investment.
If the investor linked his investment strategy solely to individualism,
the greater good of the ethnic enclave would not induce the investment.
He would be "economically self saturated." If the investor was over-
wrought by fear of failure, or the investing constraints of traditional
corporate, governmental or financial institution culture, he would not
likely utilize such a transformative investment strategy. The investor would
be "economically stunted." If the investor had the ethnic identification to
invest, but had already done enough after externally fulfilling experiences,
the further investment into an ethnic enclave economy would not occur
because it was already made. He would be "economically satisfied."
A high level of ethnic consciousness should also bring a higher sen-
sitivity to current disparities that have been ineffectively addressed
through status quo techniques. Group D is therefore more likely to still be
searching for aggressive and innovative methods to address those issues. It
may take an "audacious" approach in the mold of the Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation to embrace social entrepreneurship in the urban core.
This is the group that may incorporate the lessons of ethnic enclave in-
vesting in the tradition of the Weber theory over 70 years ago. This group
may be best suited to form a new version of credit associations and utilize
small businesses to nurture employment for the underemployed African
American males. Saliently, it may embrace rather than marginalize the
ethnic enclave economy. The reason, simply put, is that this group has an
investment influence common to all those techniques, the ethnically-
inspired social entrepreneurship.
112. No empirical studies have been conducted on this group dynamic. Future eth-
nographic research could provide a testing of the theory, as will be discussed below.
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111. APPLICATION OF ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES
Within the general rubric of law and economics, two camps are at
theoretical war. Philosophical pundits in one corner are known as neo-
classical economists with a fundamental premise that each individual will
conform his or her behavior to make rational choices to maximize what-
ever causes satisfaction, i.e. self interest."13
Importantly, the search for satisfaction is not necessarily always eco-
nomic. It is a function of utility, and how one attempts to increase it
through behavior that achieves a goal of high value. So one may maxi-
mize her utility if she chooses to pay a lesser price for ground chuck in
the face of price increases for the steak previously preferred. Behavior was
adjusted to meet a higher level of satisfaction - the actor's perception that
it is better to buy a slightly lesser grade of beef for a better price. This "self
interest" is not only the negative connotation of selfishness. It could in-
clude a mix of personal happiness and pleasure. In the above example, the
self interest in the ground beef purchase could have also been motivated
by remembering that her spouse prefers ground chuck for the dish that
was going to be prepared. The satisfaction is therefore more precisely
termed by the neo-classical economists as "utility" to avoid broader com-
mingled concepts of selfishness and self interest."
4
From that premise, three economic principles are generated: (1)
there is an "inverse relation between price charged [value of an item] and
quantity demanded (the Law of Demand)";"5 (2) for denial of a resource,
an opportunity cost is incurred, which has consequences on wealth of the
individual and society;"6 and (3) "resources tend to gravitate toward their
most valuable uses" if the open market is allowed to operate without
113. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 3-5 (6th ed., Aspen Pub-
lishers, Inc. 2003). See also GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HuMAN
BEHAVIOR 6-11 (1976).
114. POsNER, supra note 113, at 3-5.
115. Id. at 4.
116. Id. at 6.The opportunity cost is a benefit forgone by employing a resource in a
manner that denies its use. Id. For example, one who attends college for four years has
forgone the money he could have made as an employee over that period. Likewise, a
homemaker who could otherwise be employed outside the home has incurred an oppor-
tunity cost for the value of her labor, though no pecuniary equivalent is established. Id. In
economist terms, the type of "cost" can vary. There are "sunk" costs, which refer to re-
source expenditures for past values (e.g., throwing "good money after a bad idea"), and
"forward" costs, where a rational actor is attempting to maximize utility and the resources
are expended to bring satisfaction in the future. See id. at 7.These forward costs are advo-
cated by the neo-classical economists. See, e.g., id. There are "social cost[s]," which
"diminish[] the wealth of society," and "private cost[s]," which instead "rearrangen that
wealth." Id. at 6. Presumably, resources expended that decrease incentives to work are so-
cial costs diminishing wealth of the society. In contrast, when the buyer of a residence
receives property and the seller gains money this is a private cost because it rearranges
resources rather than generating a loss of resources.
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undue interference from the government. ' That is to say, a negotiated
price between two individuals without undue pressures from external
sources such as government price fixing will achieve a more valuable out-
put through maximizing the self interest of the buyer. The value is the
price paid by the buyer who presumably saw a value greater than the
seller's economic cost." 8 Under this neo-classical economic theory, effi-
ciency refers to the allocation of resources to maximize value or wealth. 19
As this Article will discuss particularly in the Ethnivestor analysis, when
culturally compatible individuals employ these principles in the market-
place, they may lead to an overall greater "efficiency" than a gentrifier
model for tax credits.
In the other corner of legal economic theorists are groups that focus
not so much on individual behaviors as on group dynamics that impact a
greater goal of the society-curing an injustice. 12 One such group is the
"environmental justice" movement. In their view, an allocation of re-
sources by maximizing an individual's satisfaction and utility through pure
market forces is "simply inapplicable" where the goal is to achieve justice
because "land use ... is not an unencumbered market" where people are
free to choose their desired outcomes.122 According to these theorists, so-
cial justice is the important goal, and governmental intervention may be
required to achieve a more equal distribution of resources (i.e., distribu-
123tive justice). As applied in the land use context, these pundits assert that
a disproportionately high number of industrial waste plants are placed in
low income communities of racial minorities throughout the United
States, and pure market forces does not cure the injusti 124Stats, nd uremaret r s e  t r theinjustice. Rather, gov-
ernmental intervention may be required to force corporate decision
makers to "do the right thing" and make a more equal reallocation of re-
117. Id. at9.
118. Id. at 9-10.
119. Id. at 11.
120. See Alice Kaswan, Distributive Justice and the Environment, 81 N.C. L. Rav. 1031,
1035 (2003).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1081-82.
123. Id. at 1036. By way of example, one Camden, New Jersey neighborhood be-
came the site for various industrial facilities. Those facilities include plants for sewage
treatment, trash conversions, cogeneration, and two plants listed as superfind sites with
potentially large releases of hazardous substances. Again, these facilities are all within one
neighborhood. Id. at 1034. "Ninety-one percent of the residents.., are persons of color.. "
are poor, and "suffer from a disproportionately high rate of asthma and other respiratory
ailments." Id. at 1033 (quoting S. Camden in Action v. NJ. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 145 E
Supp. 2d 446, 451 (D.N.J.), rev'd, 274 E3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001), cert denied, 122 S. Ct. 2621
(2002)). It is a pattern repeated across the country. Id. at 1034.
124. See id. at 1035.
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sources (i.e., more fairly distribute the waste plants so the adverse health
effects do not fall disproportionately on the poor) . 2
Similarly, advocates of critical race theory embrace a discourse on
the effect of discrimination on groups of America's citizenry and criticize
neo-classical economics as "methodological individualism [at] fundamen-
tal tension with the concept of race, intrinsically a group concept."
12
6
These theorists consider it a fatal flaw for neo-classical economists to ig-
nore the possibility that victims of discrimination could have psychic
losses as part of the opportunity costs analysis and to likewise ignore the
transactional costs for racial discrimination in commercial transactions.
27
What appears common to those adversaries of neo-classical eco-
nomics is their prioritization of a social humanistic goal through an
analysis of how groups impact other groups rather than focusing on the
science of individual behaviors. One scholar characterized neo-classical
law and economists as those who "seek to make law appear more, rather
than less, scientific and thus avoid references to the humanities.' 28 Indeed,
as a prominent theorist of neo-classical economics, Judge Richard A. Pos-
ner boldly admits that the theories advocated are an abstraction, "[but]
abstraction is the essence of scientific inquiry, and economics aspires to be
scientfic.'' 29 The counterclaim is that "[f]aw is not, however, a natural sci-
ence. Even though references to the natural and social sciences can be
helpful, law involves human practices and experiences that are not fully
explainable or understandable in scientific terms."' '30 For the law to be
effective, it must address human need and fairness beyond profit mo-
tives. 131
The Ethnivestor model and tax policy implications are a blend of
both worlds. On the one hand the Ethnivestor model is designed to pri-
oritize a social goal-revitalization of urban core America to primarily
benefit the low income residents without increasingly marginalizing
them.Yet the means of accomplishing that goal includes the infusion of
neo-classical principles of opportunity cost and increasing market based
125. In the land use debate, one scholar was accused of using neo-classical principles
to argue that disparities are not necessarily unjust, since a community could assert its pref-
erences and "what might be undesirable to one community might be desirable to another."
Id. at 1038.The Kaswan response was that the free market based model does not solve the
problem of inequitable distribution of resources; nor is established public policy likely to
solve the problem. See id. at 1038-39.
126. Robert E. Suggs, Poisoning the Well: Law & Economics and Racial Inequality, 57
HASTINGS UJ. 255,259 (2005).
127. See Robert E. Suggs, Racial Discrimination in Business Transactions, 42 HASTINGS
L.J. 1257, 1284-87 (1991).
128. Robin Paul Malloy, Framing the Market: Representations of Meaning and Value in
Law, Markets, and Culture, 51 BuFF. L. REV. 1, 17 (2003).
129. POSNER, supra note 113, at 17.
130. Malloy, supra note 128, at 17-18.
131. Id.
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behavior models so that over time the self-help ethnic entrepreneurship
(market based) diminishes the need for public funding for this purpose.
The Ethnivestor model has an implicit premise that a governmental
incentive subsidy alone shall not revitalize urban America in a way that
maximizes the wealth of underutilized resources. Neither can we depend
on gentrified projects to do for that group what it may do for itself. Those
underutilized resources are both a segment of the African American mid-
dle class (Ethnivestors) and the urban core residents that are otherwise
being marginalized by gentrified projects. By incorporating an Eth-
nivestor blended motivation of philanthropy and profit (social
entrepreneurship), African American resources are made more productive,
wealth is increased, and through the small business concentrations and
school of entrepreneurship concepts, the resources of low income core
residents are enhanced. The desired result is a more efficient market
within the ethnic enclave. 132
To explore the Ethnivestor model in economic terms we return to
two important concepts: utility and efficiency.
A. Utility
Under traditional neo-classical configuration, "utility" refers to "the
value of an uncertain cost or benefit as distinct from a certain one" and
satisfaction garnered from the behavior. 133 The Posner utility configuration
is also expansive enough to incorporate the concept of group.3 4 The label
used is "utilitarianism," which is aggregating utility across persons, treating
them as "cells in the overall social organism rather than as individuals.'
3
1
As discussed below, the Ethnivestor and the gentrifier investor have a dif-
132. Arguably, if purely market forces were in operation without governmental regu-
lation or incentives, the Ethnivestor should come to the aid of the community with which
he or she has the greatest cultural connectivity. The issue of whether a pure market based
scheme to revitalize the urban community is superior to a federal program is a fight for
another day. Since Congress has provided such an incentive, this author considers it more
valuable to propose a framework that combines private forces with the reality of the
NMTC incentive.
133. POSNER, supra note 113, at 10. Two components to utility are inextricably wed to
risk and demonstrated by the classic Posner illustration of a person having a choice be-
tween $1 million outright and a 10% chance of receiving $10 million. Id. One form of
utility is a measure of one's appetite for risk to determine what that person values most.
See id. at 10-11. Does he take a low risk ($1 million) or does he increase the risk to get
the chance to achieve the greater reward? The risk averse person would take the $1 mil-
lion. Id. at 10. This is the value or expected benefit component of utility because the
person values the $1 million now more than the increased opportunity later. Id. The sec-
ond concept of utility is philosophical, meaning an approximation of happiness and
satisfaction. Id. at 11.
134. Id. at 12.
135. Id.
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ferent sense of utility, both in terms how they define value/satisfaction,
and how they view utilitarianism in their investment decision making.
The Posner principle of value as a component of utility is that you
value consistent with what you are willing to risk. 116 Importantly, there is
no prescription that one must value pure pecuniary profit to the exclu-sionof al oter . 137
sion of all other motives. Therefore one can still be motivated by non-
financial purposes even if it makes the investment financially risky. In the
Ethnivestor context, it could easily be perceived as a lower pecuniary risk
to build a mixed use condominium unit with restaurants and high end
units.Value is conceived through the buyers-gentrifiers who could afford
to pay at a price beyond the developer's cost of producing the resource. It
would be more risky to invest in a needs-inspired small business (Properly
Purposed Projects) that assist primarily the target poor people within the
community. For an Ethnivestor who values the higher risk for the greater
good of the ethnic enclave, the value and satisfaction components of util-
ity are found by investing in such Properly Purposed Projects. The social
entrepreneurial motivation, though utilitarian in nature is nonetheless his
"value" and utility. 38
Conversely the non-Ethnivestor (termed gentrifier investor) would
most likely invest, if at all, based on maximizing a financial or pecuniary
return on that investment. The gentrifier investor139 would have a different
utility-maximizing profit-because that is what he or she values. The
uncertain commodity desired by the gentrifier investor is increased wealth
from a new market-the low income community. The certain item used
for comparison is whatever other investment he could have made in an
older market.
136. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing Posner's definition of
utility).
137. PosNER, supra note 113, at 11-12.
138. In the Posner hypothetical of the person with the choice of $1 million now or
10% of $10 million, the person taking the $1 million was termed more "risk averse." Id. at
10. If, say, the interest rate he received compensated him for the higher risk, where his
total return was greater than if he merely invested the $1 million on receipt, the risk averse
choice would not "maximize" his pecuniary self interest. The important concept is that as
long as his concept of value was to be risk adverse he maximized his self interest because
he essentially defined self interest consistent with that value. Thus, simply making the most
money possible is not always value and thus is not always the definition of utility. In the
NMTC Ethnivestor context, the Mall of Needs type of investments may not generate a
maximum financial return, but that is acceptable if it fits within his concept of value to
incorporate non-pecuniary goals like revitalization of the ethnic enclave and its core citi-
zenry. See id. at 10-11.
139. The gentrifier investor includes those of the same mind who own the CDE or
the QCB.
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B. Efficiency
Another component of utility is diminishing marginal utility." ° The
concept is that a commodity means less to someone who already has a lot
of it, e.g. a second million dollars to a millionaire is not as satisfying as the
first.' In economic terminology, those who already have attained utility
(value and satisfaction) from a certain item will likely attribute less value
to getting more of the same. Thus, the utility diminishes as he attains
more of same of whatever he had. 4 3 There is also a reciprocal aspect in
that while utility diminishes for one party of a voluntary transaction, there
may be a corresponding increase in utility for the other party to the trans-
action. Simplistically stated by example, "[a] loss of a dollar hurts the
millionaire less than the gain of a dollar pleases the pauper.'' 44 In the Eth-
nivestor context, I submit that the Ethnivestor will retain more utility
when investing in the ethnic enclaves than the gentrifier investor if the
NMTC program prioritizes Congressional goals of helping those in
greatest need in the target community. An Ethnivestor who invests in part
to help those target residents should have a correspondingly higher
amount of satisfaction and value because it is tied to betterments of hu-
manity, not just pecuniary rewards. If the Properly Purposed Project were
mandated under the program, the Gentrifier investor's satisfaction and
140. PosNER, supra note 113, at 10-11.
141. Id. at 11.
142. Id. at 10.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 470. Posner is quick to caution that this does not mean redistributing
substantial wealth from higher income people to lower income people will increase total
utility. Id. Posner's controversial assumption is that "people who work hard to make money
and succeed in making it are, on average, those who value money the most, having given
up other things such as leisure to get it." Id. Posner cites no empirical proofs for that as-
sumption. It could just as easily be that those who have substantial wealth have it because
of inheritance or because they were provided greater opportunities to make money from
the labor of others. If a partner in a law firm bills out his own labor at $300 an hour, he
could have gross revenues of $2,400 for an 8 hour work day. But if he also derives 50% of
the billable time for three associates in his office who each bill at $200 per hour for 8
hours that day, his take for the day is an additional $2,400. Thus he has doubled his in-
come, not because he worked harder, but because he was in a position to profit from the
labor of others - others who may have even worked harder, and been just as talented or
more, but were not yet blessed with the leveraging opportunity. The Posner model fails to
recognize the effect to the value of privilege, class, legacy, or inheritance, and instead posits
only the possibility that the difference is due to hard work and personal sacrifice as an
"opportunity cost" of the wealthy. See id. The opportunity costs would be far greater for
an associate who deserved to be partner but was denied because she was a woman, or
because he was African American, or gay. This, again, reinforces the notion that neo-
classical economics is not designed to solve social justice issues because it fails to explain or
measure the opportunity costs of those who have been victims of such things as discrimi-
nation, legacy, and inheritance.
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value would diminish more quickly because the financial returns would
be more difficult to achieve.
Under neo-classical theory there is an important correlation be-
tween "utility" and "efficiency." Efficiency is the allocation of resources in
which utility and value is maximized.' If indeed utility and value is not
confined to pecuniary notions of wealth, then the non-pecuniary value is
also part of increased efficiency. It follows that if one invests consistent
with those values, utility should increase, or be reduced at a lesser rate, if
the purposes of that investment are fulfilled. In the NMTC context, if
Properly Purposed Projects are the only statutorily authorized ventures,
the Ethnivestor is likely to achieve greater satisfaction and value from the
investment because his investment behavior is aligned with the project's
authorized purposes under the NMTC program. The greater the value
and satisfaction, the greater the utility and value. That allocation of a re-
source, the investment in the Properly Purposed Project, is therefore more
likely to bring greater efficiency in an economic sense than a gentrifier
investment in a Problematic Purposed Project that falls outside permitted
project goals. A gentrifier investor who seeks primarily individual profit
would find more frustration than satisfaction if he (1) suffers in financial
returns, (2) has to remain invested in the target community beyond the
tax credit haven, or (3) is unwilling to hire target residents or incorporate
target community ideas of proper projects, when he is really only inter-
ested in profitability. The lesser satisfaction and value is a lesser utility. The
lesser utility is a lesser efficiency.
To buttress the point, I return to the studies of the Cuban ethnic
enclaves in the early 1990s. Researchers concluded that when those of
Cuban descent established locational clusters of ethnic enterprises, hired
people from within the ethnic enclave, pooled their savings in rotating
credit associations, and developed sympathetic suppliers and customer
bases, a vertical and horizontal integration occurred (i.e. an ethnic enclave
economy) that became "hyperefficient.' 4 6 Part of the key findings was
145. POSNER, supra note 113, at 11. Again, Posner prefers to shy away from applying
efficiency to doing good for a society and groups within it. In his words, efficiency "has
limitations as an ethical criterion of social decision making." Id. at 11-12. The relevant
question is: "whose limitations?"Why not modify an economic theory to have as its goal
the curing of a social ill rather than an explanation of an individual's self interest? If that
creates a "humanitarian" aspect, so be it, since it is as humans as a group that we hope to
cope with our earthly existence. Isn't that the higher priority of a civilized society -
peaceful coexistence where all people are treated fairly? I would call economic theories
that incorporate such motivations "econo-realism." If instead the primary purpose of an
economic theory is the explanation, prediction, and intervention of principles that only
promote an individual's self interest, does that theory advance or retard our movement
toward becoming a more civilized society?
146. HALTER, supra note 9, at 29-30.
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that these businesses employ co-ethnic workers to "serve their own ethnic
market and/or the general population.'''
47
The ideal Ethnivestor is an African American investor with a com-
bination of economic resources and an ethnic sense of solidarity. This
Ethnivestor can utilize the gaming strategies of successful immigrants and
African Americans prior to the integration era, when the self-help entre-
preneurship was forced by externalities of discrimination or economic
exclusion. Whether this newly configured African American group of
Ethnivestors can become similarly motivated by choice, not by force, re-
mains to be seen. There may be scholars who would dispute the premise
that cultural connectivity can lead to this type of investment behavior. I
submit that it is overbroad to apply such an assumption to all African
Americans in the United States. I have described the narrowly drawn
characteristics that would likely be required for such a group to come
forward. They could not be so stunted by prior miscalculations that they
are too fearful to invest. Nor could they be so satisfied by their prior suc-
cesses that they no longer hunger for the investment goals. Nor could
they be so saturated with individualism and self-interest that they have no
behavioral motivation to help those less fortunate in the ethnic enclave. In
short, the "Weber Theory" of culturally-based entrepreneurship should
apply to African Americans, just as it has applied to other groups. For an
Ethnivestor, economic efficiency increases with the combination of the
following benefits (1) financial rewards as an investor (2) an increased abil-
ity to assist the community in employment, empowerment, and long term
quality of life, and (3) achieving those goals without marginalizing those
core residents. The NMTC scheme currently allows dilution of that pur-
pose through gentrifier investment practices.
One could assert that for such a model to be viable there must be an
analysis of opportunity costs, and that true efficiency cannot occur if the
forgone costs exceed the benefit. 48 The Ethnivestor pays a financial price
when investing in a Properly Purposed Project such as a health clinic re-
quired because of the disproportionate need for sickle cell or kidney
dialysis treatment. Assume the same money could have been invested in
some other manner with a greater financial return. If monetary return
was what the Ethnivestor primarily valued there would be an opportunity
cost to him because of the greater return forgone. But since the value,
satisfaction, and therefore utility includes the social aspects of the entre-
preneurship there is a minimal sense of loss, if any. Therefore, there is no
material social loss to society, but instead a private rearrangement of re-
sources from the Ethnivestor to the target resident within the ethnic
147. Id. at 27-28.
148. Recall that the opportunity cost was one of three principles that springs from
the neo-classical bedrock assumption that a rational actor conforms his behavior to maxi-
mize his self interests, and that a social cost diminishes wealth in society, while a private
cost merely rearranges that wealth. POSNER, supra note 113, at 6.
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enclave. So while validating the general principle of diminishing marginal
utility, the Ethnivestor has less of it because his reasons for investing match
the results of a Properly Purposed Project.
C. Application of Utility and Efficiency
The charts below graphically illustrate how efficiencies vary be-
tween the Ethnivestor and the gentrifier. Chart A traces utility and
efficiency for the Ethnivestor. Chart B traces utility and efficiency for the
gentrifier investor. In both charts, the benefits to the target resident (i.e.
the low income residents) are measured. The result is that there is more
economic utility and efficiency for the Ethnivestor than the gentrifier
investor. There is also a greater value and utility for the target resident
with Ethnivestor projects than with gentrifier projects.
CHART A
Ethnivestor
Utility (EU)
Baseline
In Chart A, the Ethnivestor utility is measured on the vertical pole
on the left of the chart. That utility includes all those Ethnivestor charac-
teristics that motivated the investment behavior, including the desire for
increased well being for target residents, despite lesser financial returns to
the Ethnivestor. Utility for the target resident 149 who receives the benefit
of the Properly Purposed Project is measured on the right vertical pole.
That utility incorporates enhanced employment opportunities, greater
access to role models, and of course whatever other residual benefits flow
from having a Properly Purposed Project.
149. The use of "target resident" here is consistent with the NMTC statutory defini-
tion of"target population" found in I.R.C. § 45D(e)(2) (West 2006).
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Across the bottom horizontally from left to right is the increase in
Properly Purposed Projects. The horizontal line titled EU tracks the in-
crease or decrease in the Ethnivestor utility as each project is built with
investor funds. The horizontal line titled TRU tracts the increase or de-
crease in the target resident utility as each project is built. The horizontal
line titled "TR Baseline" is the lower existing utility of the target resident
prior to the development of each of the three projects. Since the Eth-
nivestor's motivations include a blend of financial profit and social well
being for the ethnic enclave, the measured increase or decrease in utility
as projects are built should also be measured against those variables.
Obviously it is difficult to quantify the extent of intangible benefits.
It should be sufficient to employ the neo-classical assumption that the
investor is rational in determining what opportunity costs he is willing to
forgo, much like someone who pays more for an antique vase than any
other bidder in an auction. The value is measured by what he is willing to
pay.We assume the total of social benefits and profits forgone are included
in his analysis of what to pay. Appraisers have developed methods to sepa-
rate intangible assets such as copyrights, patents, and accounts receivable
from the hard assets of plant and machinery in the price paid for a busi-
ness. I have every faith that appraisers can formulate models for separating
other forms of intangible assets as well. But to satisfy the economists' sci-
entific urges, the conceptual model contains a baseline representing the
extent of resident utility existing prior to the enhancement from the
Properly Purposed Project. As noted, that baseline is horizontal line B.
Area A represents the total increase in utility for the target resident,
i.e. the amount of increased utility from where he was prior to the project
compared to where he was after each project. Notice that there should be
some increased utility after each project, assuming it provides the benefits
contemplated in the needs assessment for the target population as defined
by the statute.'50 Area B depicts the Ethnivestor utility, which includes
both the extent of value and satisfaction received from seeing increased
well being for the target residents and the financial return on the invest-
ment. In this graph, the amount of satisfaction the Ethnivestor receives
from the social enhancement to the target resident is assumed to be less
than the sense of satisfaction received by the target resident. This is based
on the reciprocal notion embedded in the concept of diminishing mar-
ginal utility that a pauper will value receipt of say a $10,000 dollar job
from a well-healed Ethnivestor more than that Ethnivestor will value the
increased incremental income and thanksgiving from the pauper. That
could obviously be reversed where a wealthy person values his gift most
when he sees the joy it brings. That is the essence of philanthropy. For
purposes of illustration, however, I posit the circumstance where the
combined benefits in utility to the Ethnivestor are less than the utility to
150. Id.
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the target resident. The point remains the same. As long as the Eth-
nivestor's total utility is a net plus to himself, (i.e. the investment benefits,
both social and financial, exceed the forgone opportunity costs of time,
alternate investments, etc) there is increased efficiency.
If the Ethnivestor loses faith in the project or cares less about en-
hancing the ethnic enclave and its residents, the utility drops. This would
be evidenced by selling of the investment because, in the Ethnivestor's
formulation, the marginal utility decline reached a critical net loss level.
Even in the success model, there is some assumed leveling of utility for
the Ethnivestor after the third project. The assumption is that after a cer-
tain number of investments, more of the same bring a diminished
marginal utility.Yet as long as a substantial part of the value of the invest-
ment is viewed as the social entrepreneurial benefit, the investment can
continue to be an added efficiency to the enclave and the Ethnivestor.
Chart B represents the tracing of utility and efficiency for the gen-
trifler investor ("G.I.").The guideposts are the same as for the Ethnivestor
in Chart A. However instead of parallel benefits between the G.I. and the
target resident, the respective utility to the parties grow further apart over
time. The target resident may receive roughly the same sense of satisfac-
tion, though this is highly questionable if the investor does not have a
personal commitment to the well being of the target community. Even
assuming efficiency equivalence there is a probable loss of utility and effi-
ciency from the G.I. An investor that defines maximization of self interest
in purely financial terms and purely for self benefit without a correspond-
ing value for the non-financial benefits to the target resident and ethnic
enclave would likely grow increasingly dissatisfied with the investment.
That again assumes the NMTC statute and regulations require a Properly
Purposed Project designed for long term benefits to the existing target
community and residents. Under those circumstances the gentrifier inves-
tor is likely to bring less efficiency in an economic sense and greater
social costs because utility seepage occurs from the transfer of resources.
As to personal utility, he could have invested in some other venture that
was not hindered by social returns. The commodity of time and related
resource losses are greater than the return.
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CHART B
Gentifier Target Resident
Investor Utility (TRU)
Utility (GIU)
TR Baseline
JI
1 2 3
In a more macro view of utility and efficiency, there are opportunity
costs that span various entities in a gentrifier project, governmental as well
as private. Opportunity costs ofgentrified NMTC projects are fundamen-
tally no different than the observed byproducts of other gentrified urban
redevelopment programs."' Those costs are substantial and have been
enumerated in prior studies. 152 There are physical construction costs. This
refers to actual construction that was ineffective at meeting resident needs,
and thereby precluding construction that would have been better suited.5 3
In theory, it is akin to the property appraisal concepts of the failure to
build based on the "highest and best use" for the site. Also prominent is
the lost time and effort of governmental actors for misguided develop-
ment projects.5 4 The staff time, including the huge resources associated
with negotiating with private developers, creating and evaluating feasibil-
ity reports, holding public hearings, and then analyzing and publishing
materials therefrom are all costs for gentrified projects that fail to primar-
ily meet the needs of the target residents. 5 There are also costs from the
nationalization of project types, where the cookie cutter format of office
buildings, high-tech developments, and hotel-convention centers com-
plexes have replicated themselves as a matter of policy. 6 That developer's
strategy also compounds the error since, in many cases, the construction
151. Benjamin B. Quinones, Redevelopment Redefined: Revitalizing the Central City with
Resident Control, 27 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 689, 742-744 (1994).
152. See id. at 724-751.
153. Id. at 724.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 742-743.
156. Id. at 743.
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would have occurred in any event and the subsidies were not needed. 157
The more obvious and devastating personal costs are to the low income
residents themselves who suffer the inordinate risk of displacement or
marginalizaton."8
Despite attempts to explain behavior in economic terms, the issue
should still be raised: does the neo-classical economic theory advocate or
reject the use of utilitarian ideals to help achieve social justice? If Posner is
the voice box for neo-classical economics, the answer appears to be that
achieving social justice is not a goal, only an incidental byproduct in route
to finding an individual's self.interest. 9 Posner readily admits that societal
decisions of what is just and legal do not always hinge on economics, as
when we make illegal private forms of discrimination based on race or160 . ),161
sex. In his words, "there is more to justice than economics. On that
point perhaps all scholars can agree. But Posner's abhorrence for sacrific-
ing oneself for the greater good of a group seems to sidestep the inquiry
into the effect, in terms of cost or utility, of discrimination by groups and
the effect of overcoming it. This brings into question whether neo-
classical economics is truly intent on solving issues of social justice, or
whether its goal is to explain and prioritize maximization of individual
wealth. In response to his own rhetorical question of how utilitarianism
can be defended, Posner states:
"One answer is that the things that make wealth possible-not
only or mainly luxury goods, but leisure, comfort, modern
medicine, and opportunities for self-expression and self-
realization-are major ingredients of most people's happiness,
so that wealth maximization is instrumental to utility maximi-
zation. This answer ties efficiency to utilitarianism.,
6
1
It may be the case that "most people's" happiness is tied to self. But the
Ethnivestor model is a narrow class where pecuniary self-sacrifice may be
part of the investment motivation in the NMTC program, and the scales
of influence tip toward the goal of the greater good.
157. Id. at 744.
158. Id. at 750-751.
159. The neo-classical theory at bottom depends on a notion of actors being "ra-
tional" with a "disposition to choose," POSNER, supra note 113, at 17, for "self interest." Id.
at 3. Martin Luther King may have had premonitions of assassination, but his choice to
continue his cause though it may cost his life was not self interest, but instead self sacrifice.
This motivation for self sacrifice is not easily incorporated, and certainly not emphasized
as part of the neo-classical economics view. As social justice is entwined with the notion of
self sacrifice, at least by its leaders, neo-classical economics does not appear to this author
as embracing those concepts.
160. See id.
161. Id. at 28.
162. Id. at 16.
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Revitalizing urban America without marginalizing its urban low in-
come residents, I submit, is not just a social goal, but a socioeconomic
goal. The former African American mayor of Seattle did not characterize
163gentrification in his city as inherently racist, but rather as economic.
Whether racism is part of the phenomenon is not the focus of this Article.
Rather, at issue here is what tax credit policy and private equity model
will help solve the problem. The Ethnivestor model is an attempt to assist
in achieving that goal, so it is utilitarian in that sense. And as such, it
modifies the neo-classical economic design to expand the concept of util-
ity and efficiency to incorporate such a goal. The modification is not
entirely inconsistent with the Posner utility model at its root. Posner em-
phasizes at the outset of his seminal publication that his view of
economics is broader than the rubric of inflation, unemployment, and
business factors tied to profiteering. 164 Posner admits that the confusion
could easily occur.1 65 His bedrock assumption is that a person is a "rational
maximizer of his self interest. 166 This could lead a reasonable thinker to
equate self interest with increased "wealth" in pecuniary terms. To avoid
that assumption, Posner says economists prefers to use the more precise
term, "utility" to describe a broader concept of "self interest."167 Utility is
broad enough a term to include, as Posner states, "a rational utility maxi-
mizer in all areas of life, not just in his 'economic affairs'.' ', 68 Posner
considers this assumption as "central" to his entire neo-classical design.
69
Thus, when this Article incorporates into the model the notion that
an Ethnivestor's motivation for investment is to assist the ethnic enclave
and the target residents even if it does not maximize his individual pecu-
niary sense of "wealth," it is nonetheless consistent with neo-classical
economic theory, with the possible modification that the goal may be to
help that community beyond merely a means of maximizing self interest.
It really becomes almost a semantic issue of how one defines "utility" and
"self interest." If those terms include social justice as a goal, then it is en-
tirely consistent with neo-classical economics. If, as I suspect, achieving a
socially just result is permitted by neo-classical economists only if it is a
means to maximizing self interest and utility, then my theory is a modifi-
cation of that view. More precisely, an Ethnivestor has a mix of
motivations, both philanthropic and profit driven, and that is how he en-
visions "value" and "satisfaction" for the utility of his investment behavior.
Regardless of whether it fits neatly into neo-classical definitions of utility,
163. Blaine Harden, In Parts of US. Northwest, A Changing Face, THE WASHINGTON
POST,June 19, 2006, at A3.
164. PostNER, supra note 113, at 3.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 4.
167. Id. at 3.
168. Id. at 4.
169. See id.
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this Ethnivestor model should be viewed as a viable theoretical construct
for increasing private equity funds from a previously under-conmitted
source for a socially just goal. And even if we assume Posner's preferred
non-utilitarian model for utility, the Ethnivestor includes in his individual
investing behavior the notion that the greater good is part of his satisfac-
tion and value.
IV. APPLICATION OF ETHNIVESTOR MODEL
There are various outcomes that can be envisioned from infusion of
the Ethnivestor into the NMTC transactions. The outcomes need to be
achievable and measurable as they were for the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation. The last section of this Article calls for empirical analysis of
the model, but the theoretical basis is nonetheless grounded in common
sense and prior research,just applied to different circumstances.
A. Reduced Marginalization Through Historic Small Business
Hiring Practices: Structure of the Credit
The current regulatory scheme for a general NMTC transaction can
be described as follows:
1. The investor"" must invest a qualified equity investment
("QEI") into a qualified community development entity
("CIDE").)171
2. The CDE must then take the investor's QEI and invest
those sums into a low income community project, either
directly, or through a qualified community-based organi-
zation ("QCB") or other approved entity that serves the
low income area.
172
3. The credit is considered for the period commencing
with the date the initial investment was made and each of
the 6 anniversary dates thereafter. 17 3 The credit is 5% for
the initial three years, and 6% for the remaining 4 years,
equating to a 39% credit over the total of 7 years.174
170. The investor is also termed the "taxpayer" since that person is the recipient of
the tax credits.
171. See I.R.C. § 45D(a)(1)-(3) (West 2006).
172. 26 C.F.R. § 1.45D-1(d)(1)(i)(2007).
173. I.R.C. § 45D(a)(3)(A)(B) (West 2006).
174. To illustrate the credit, assume an equity investment of $100,000 in year 1. For
years 1, 2, and 3, the credit is $5,000 (5% of $100,000) for a total of $15,000. The 6%
credit on the same $100,000 investment for the following four years is $6,000 per year for
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Procedurally, the program is administered through the Community
Development Financial Institutions Fund ("CDFI"). The application
process requires a mini-business plan prior to certification of acceptance
into the program.175
One threshold task prior to examining specific Ethnivestor criteria
is to establish a more investment compatible environment under the
NMTC program. There appear to be less than five African American
owned CDEs among all the Allocatees granted in the several years of the
program's existence.17 6 One barrier to more African American CDEs is
the same barrier that hinders minority entrepreneurship in general-a
lack of capital and exposure to capital markets. 77 The current NMTC
program has allowed many large scale projects in the range of $100 mil-
lion and beyond. The majority of them are Problematic Purposed Projects
like those described earlier. Without the money for such large scale pro-
jects, minority group CDE participation is practically non-existent.
Practically all of the Problematic Purposed Projects are among the most
each of the remaining four years, totaling $24,000. The combined credit is $39,000
($15,000 plus $24,000).
175. I.R.C. § 45D(0(2)(A) (West 2006). The procedural steps are summarized
below:
An application requesting an allocation from the total funds available in that
round must be presented to the CDFI within the prescribed time period.
The application must detail specifically how the investments of cash ("eq-
uity") will flow into a qualified entity which, in turn, will funnel
substantially all of those equity investments into a low income community.
The CDFI selects applicants for an allocation based on criteria that gives
priority to any entity that either (1) has a record of having successfully pro-
vided capital or technical assistance to disadvantaged businesses or
communities, I.R.C. 5 45D(t)(2)(A) (West 2006), or (2) intends to make
qualified low income community investments in I or more businesses where
the persons holding the majority equity interests are unrelated to the tax-
payer, I.R.C. 5 45D(O(2)(B) (West 2006).
The CDE then has a 5 year period to invest in qualifying low income com-
munity investments or be subject to reallocation of those funds to other
CDE's.
See IRC § 45D (b)(1)(C) (West 2006); see also 26 C.FR. § 1.45D(o(2)(B)(2007).
176. Two Hundred Thirty Three CDE's have received allocations as of June 29, 2006
according to CDFI announcements on its website at www.cdfifund.gov. The CDFI has
published profiles of the CDEs that received awards. Three appear on that list as "minority
owned or minority controlled." See the website for current profiles. The 2006 profiles are
no longer listed. U.S. DER OF THE TREAsuRY, THE COMMUNITY DEV. FIN. INSTITUTIONS
FUND, NEW M~ARKEr TAx CREDIT PROGRAM AwARm PROFILES (2007), http://www.cdfifund.
gov/docs/2007/nmtc/NMTCProgramProfiles.pdf£
177. Hunt, supra note 93, at 388.
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expensive to build, seemingly in large part because the purpose is to sat-
isfy those accustomed to more expensive life styles, the gentrifiers, rather
than the basic needs of the low income target population. The types of
projects the target community/ethnic enclaves appear to need the most
are not the most expensive. Rather, projects designed for non-
conventional financing for small business start ups, health care facilities,
and affordable housing are among the lower cost projects that are also
more properly purposed for the low income residents. If a needs assess-
ment of the statutory "target population" were primary when formulating
the project, and part of the prioritized criteria by the CDFI, there are
likely to be even smaller sized projects that can accommodate small busi-
ness capitalization. The smaller projects should open the investment
opportunity to those with comparative cultural advantages discussed
above.That would be a component to the strategy that might help return
these current NMTC target communities to bustling ethnic enclave
economies which people like WE.B. Dubois considered at the very center
of the community. Various other attributes of the Ethnivestor common to
the self-help heyday would have to exist as well, and will be discussed
below.
Since the NMTC funds are public monies designed to assist this dis-
affected group, a potential NMTC investor in the core NMTC target
communities should be cognizant of, and seek to eradicate rather than
ignore this marginalization. The Ethnivestor model attempts to incorpo-
rate the successful self-help criteria that were historically successful for
African American ethnic enclaves and others prior to the Civil Rights
focus on integration in the 1960s. That model includes small business
formations, hiring within the ethnic business class, and using the business
as a training ground to grow entrepreneurial education and experience
from within.
As to small business formations, the Ethnivestor's investment motives
are aligned with the Weber model of self-help formations in response to
hostility from the host society because of the strong ethnic influence on
decision making. A lack of access to capital has been a major hurdle to
establishment of enterprises among low income communities. The ethnic
response historically was to establish an ethnic economy where revolving
credit associations formed to provide the capital for the enclave's own
businesses. The credit association is a collection of funds that are distrib-
uted to one business owner, and upon re-pooling of additional funds,
rotated to the next business.17 1 Consistent with the Weber model, those
178. HALTER, supra note 9, at 12, and 65-66. One of the many fertile Boston studies
observed that among Korean and West Indian enclaves the men contributed to the pool,
but the women were the bankers who handled and managed the funds. Id. at 12.
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credit associations were a self-help response to the host society's bureau-
cratic hurdles imposed by the host society's formal banking system.'7 9
The credit association strategy is essentially a finance technique with
a modern application. Venture capitalists create pooled funds for investors.
One form of entity that has utilized pooled funds is a limited liability lim-
ited partnership with a corporate general partner. This type of model is
used by one of the few minority firm participants in the NMTC pro-
180
gram.
B. Increased Co-ethnic Employment
The Ethnivestor model reduces marginalization by increasing em-
ployment among co-ethnics, including the chronically underemployed
African American male youth. It should be a point of emphasis that these
federal subsidies are attempting to address a crisis in America. By way of
illustration, more than half of all core city African American men do not
finish high school. Seventy six percent of African American males in Bal-
timore, Maryland do not graduate from high school.' 81 As of 2004, 72% of
African American dropouts in their 20's were unemployed, up from 65%
in 2000.182 Incarceration levels are at historic highs and increasing, where
by their mid-30's, 6 in 10 of these high school drop outs have spent time
in prison. 183 That rate is four times higher than that of Black men in South
Africa under the apartheid regime.1
8 4
Leading scholars in ethnic economic research have found that those
who are employed in the ethnic economy are more likely than others to
become self-employed themselves, and therefore, those small businesses
become a self-help de facto "school for future entrepreneurs.""85 Though
179. Id. at 66. Proof of disparate lending practices is evident in the disproportionate
predatory lending practices, or simply the failure to loan to minorities who have similar
lending credit risks as non-minorities.
180. One of the Round IV allocatees was a limited liability limited partnership with
a corporate general partner. A minority firm organized as a limited liability company was
part of the LLLP. See U.S. DE. OF THE TREAsURY, supra note 176. The profiles now listed
are for Round V (2007), while the profiles reviewed for this Article were Round IV
(2006) and are no longer listed on the website.
181. Eric Eckholm, Plight Deepens for Black Men, Studies Warn, N.Y. TIMES, March 20,
2006, at Al.
182. Id. Eckholm was relying on data from a panel of experts at Columbia, Prince-
ton, and Harvard, who opined that the rate of disconnectedness is "far" greater for these
African American males than that of white and Hispanic men. Id.
183. Id.
184. Dash T. Douglas, A House Divided: The Social and Economic Underdevelopment of
America's Inner Cities, 10 U. FLA.J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 369, 381 (1999) (citing The Millennium
Breach: The American Dilemma, Richer and Poorer (The Milton S. Eisenhower Found.), July
28, 1998).
185. HALTER, supra note 9, at 9.
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different ethnic groups have varied patterns, niche business types, "all stem
from the initial exposure to the ethnic economy" and serve as "spring-
boards to future rewards, both economic and social ... [i.e. a "multipher
effect"].' 86 This model increases the employment opportunities for those
underemployed within the NMTC target population.
The argument can be made that funneling capital into major main-
stream projects, rather than funding small businesses, is a better means of
creating employment within low income communities. As one study con-
cluded the causal connection between capital investment in large scale
projects and job growth among low income residents is "untested and
usually unproven.' 8 7 Conversely, there is ample empirical evidence that
redevelopment project areas normally become "gentrifying markets"
without material increase in the quality of life of the low income resi-
dents.' 8 Employing that chronically underemployed group realistically
requires meeting them where they are in the employment spectrum. It
does little good to offer jobs requiring a graduate degree in economics to
those who are struggling with high school graduation requirements. It is
of greater value to establish the types of businesses where those unem-
ployed youth can be nurtured from those culturally connected role
models in their own "school for entrepreneurs" in the tradition of other
ethnic enclave economies.
C. Reduce Barriers of Entry from Transactional Costs
One important byproduct of small business Properly Purposed Pro-
jects is that they cure existing barriers of entry for Ethnivestors in NMTC
projects. Currently, the transactional costs'" and professional fees for
NMTC transactions are problematically high, and in many cases prohibi-
tive of the types of cases that a target community wants and deserves.' 90
The costs are high because the transactions are highly complex, since they
are attempting to meet gentrification goals (i.e. a substantial return on the
investment of Problematic Purposed Projects). Some projects have hun-
dreds of millions of dollars in governmental allocations for projects that
186. Id. at 10.
187. Quinones, supra note 151, at 746 (citing ROBERT MIER, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND
LOCAL DEVELOPMENT PoLIcY 34 (Tara S. Mead ed., Sage Publications 1993)).
188. See id. at 748.
189. These are professional fees, typically top heavy with billed legal and accounting
fees.
190. As noted by one NMTC analyst, "[a]n oft-repeated joke is that the program is a
full-employment program for accountants and lawyers. The complexity and expense is in
large part a function of the fact that the implementation of the program is in its early
stages." P. JEFFERSON ARmisTEAD, PRATT INST. CENTER F-OR COMMUNITY AND ENVTL. DEV.,
NEW MARKETS AND TAX CREDITS: ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES 26 (2005),
http://www.prattcenter.net/pubs/nmtc-report.pdf.
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appear to only marginally relate to the low income residents.9 If the
goals were aligned with the best interests of the target community, absent
gentrification goals, the projects would not have to be as expensive. The
transactions could be simplified to meet the more basic needs of the tar-
get community, and therefore the transactional costs would decrease
proportionally.
Secondly, a Properly Purposed Project could thoughtfully consider
less complicated entity choices that accommodate the NMTC project
goals. As discussed elsewhere in this Article, the credit association version
of pooled investments from historic ethnic economies could include a
modified venture capital model for the CDE with a corporate general
partner. The venture capital model is designed to avoid the high fee pre-
dicament. Additionally, the NMTC regulatory scheme is no impediment
to this structure. There is no requirement that the NMTC project be a
mega-million dollar deal. The criteria used to determine whether an
award is granted do not have size or dollar volume requirements. With
reduced fees, there are fewer expenses, which permits a higher return
from a smaller investment. The smaller investment is more attractive to the
ethnic investor who typically does not have access to large pooled funds.
D. Long Term Commitment to Target Community
Another criterion for the Ethnivestor is willingness for long term
commitment to the target community beyond the 7 year tax credit. The
desire for long term commitment rather than mere short term gain is ad-
vocated as criteria for the Ethnivestor because it should provide longer
term benefits for the target community, and thus a more qualitative use of
the federal subsidy funds. While a NMTC project has tax credits that are
spread over 7 years, if the project fails to maintain an enterprise with a
permanent economic base, those left after the tax credit exodus are po-
tentially left flailing as they were prior to the NMTC project, representing
a failed use of taxpayer dollars to boot. Accordingly, the Ethnivestor model
is conceptually not just a tool for current earnings or short term invest-
ment, but a platform-a spring board for future generations of those
residents to rise, as have other immigrant groups. In essence the model is
to have investors with a goal, beyond a short term return on their invest-
ment, to grow the target community. The result should aid in the quest to
establish current and future generations from within, rather than being
marginahzed by those from outside. The outside gentrification model has,
as a more likely byproduct of small benefits to the target residents, trickled
down from the gentrified wealthy who build Problematic Purposed Pro-
191. See id. at 12 (describing one illustration of a limited liability company [Advan-
tage Capital Community Development] that received a $110 million allocation, used at
least in part for a project to develop fuel cell membrane technology in Honolulu, Hawaii).
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jects. The long term commitment should flow from the Ethnivestor's in-
vestment motivation to serve the social entrepreneurial mission, to gain
the type of solidarity exhibited by African Americans of prior generations.
To facilitate a long term commitment by the Ethnivestor, the type
of entity for the CDE and a QCB should be carefully selected. The enti-
ties should be flexible enough to increase continuity between entities
both during volatile periods within the 7-year credit period, and after the
credit period when the entities can continue the business activity. The
volatile transactional potential exists because there has only been ques-
tionable monitoring of the successes and failures of such ventures.19 2 So
there is very little empirical evidence from which to establish a best prac-
tices guide or roadmap as to the most effective business types under the
NMTC scheme. It is like a stock market with no Morningstar, a bond
without Moody's. Regarding continued business activity after the 7-year
credit haven, the CDE could become an equity owner in the QCB dur-
ing the 7-year credit period and thereafter. Thus, retaining flexibility and
continuity between entities can provide increased opportunities for struc-
turing future relationships between the CDE and QCB, both of which
may be well stocked with Ethnivestors during or after the 7-year tax
credit period. 
19 3
When structuring for long term commitments in a volatile or un-
certain marketplace, some entity types have advantages over others.'94 LLC
statutes generally provide the LLC with a greater ability of the LLC to
negotiate and contract the relative liability rights between partners than
the more rigid requirements of corporations. For example, there is no
need to create special "surplus" accounts for dividends and no special
requirement for management by a board of directors or equivalent
192. Several commentators have observed that very little is known about the success
rates of the program as monitoring and accessing performance data is an extreme chal-
lenge for the CDFI. See, e.g., Dimitri Pappas, A New Approach to a Familiar Problem: The
New Market Tax Credit, 10 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEV L. 323, 339-340
(2000-01).
193. See 26 C.ER. 5 1.45D-l(d)(6)(ii)(B)(2007); New Markets Tax Credit, 69 Fed.
Reg. 77,633 (Dec. 28, 2004). Under specified conditions, the CDE many gain majority
control through voting or management rights. See 26 C.ER. § 1.45D-1(d)(6)(ii)(B)(2007);
New Markets Tax Credit, 69 Fed. Reg. 77,633 (Dec. 28,2004).
194. See Susan P. Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Catalyst Exposing The Cor-
porate Integration Question, 95 MICH L REV. 393, 446 (1996). An LLC model is often
particularly well suited for CDE and the QCD relationship, including the flexibility of
sharing profits, losses, and even partners within the transactions. The QCB may strongly
consider forming as a Limited Liability Company ("LLC") in large part because of the
need for a mutually managed structure rather than the near autonomous general partner
found in partnerships, and the concomitant need for flexible and tax favorable allocations
of profits and losses beyond corporate formations.The CDE could similarly consider the
LLC as the entity of choice for its flexible self determined management without restrictive
statutory regulations, tax advantages, and the ability to infuse several Ethnivestors as passive
investor "members."
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body.'9s Thus, it is important that an Ethnivestor model be customized so
that many African American middle class Ethnivestors can contribute the
equity for the Properly Purposed Project based on the needs assessment
of that target community.1
96
There is also a regulatory factor supporting the strategic need for a
long term commitment to the community and a flexible structure that
can be infused into the ethnic enclave economy. Obviously, the plasma of
the entire NMTC program is the cash investment. It must be qualified
(i.e. become a "QEI) as discussed above. The CDE does not have a per-
petual opportunity to invest that QEI into the low income community. A
CDE that receives an allocation from the CDFI must issue the investment
within 5 years of the execution of its Allocation Agreement or those funds
may be taken from the CDE and reallocated by the Treasury.197 If a CDE
does not meet the 5 year requirement, the target low income community
loses the benefit of whatever could have occurred positively within those
5 years.
The Ethnivestor model has advantages in that a group with a cul-
tural connectivity with the community is more likely to be attuned to
qualitative opportunities in the first instance, and to be viewed favorably
by that community in the same way a person with Chinese connectivity
195. Robert R. Keatinge, et al., The limited Liability Company:A study of the Emerging
Entity, 47 Bus. LAW. 378, 385 (1992).
196. See JOSEPH W BARTLETT, EQUITY FINANCE:VENTURE CAPITAL, BUYOUTS, RESTRUC-
TURINGS AND REORGANIZATIONS 5 (2nd ed., vol. 1,John Wiley & Sons 1995). Consideration
should also be given to a modified venture capital limited partnership model with a cor-
porate general partner. Id. Typically, a general partner attracts limited partner investors
because of the GP's expertise in financing and business acumen for the type of business
undertaken. See id. at 4. The multiple limited partners (e.g. Ethnivestors) contribute funds
but do not materially participate in management functions. See id. The corporate general
partner owes a fiduciary duty to the limited partnership and the individual limited part-
ners. ROBERT W HAMILTON & JONATHAN R. MACEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS: INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 141 (10th
ed.,Thomson West 2007). So Ethnivestors, as limited partners, despite a lack of direct man-
agement power, can still bring actions against a corporate general partner for wasting assets
or misappropriation of the partnerships' property, In re USACafes, L.P Litig., 600 A.2d 43,
48 (Del. Ch. 1991), or for intermingling of partnership assets and failure to maintain ade-
quate records. HAMILTON & MACEY, supra note 196, at 144. Consideration should be
provided for a Subchapter S corporation, but its flexibility and continuity is significantly
impaired. It can only have shareholders who are individuals, estates, or certain types of
trusts. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(B) (West 2007). It cannot have a shareholder that is a C corpo-
ration, an S corporation (unless it is a wholly owned subsidiary of another S corporation),
an LLC or a partnership. Id. at (b)(1). It should be remembered that an increasing number
of states follow the model LLC act which authorizes a single member LLC. Uniform
Limited Liability Company Act, § 202(a)(1996). So the future funding source of a QCB
could be a financially well-healed Ethnivestor who owns her own LLC. If the QCB be-
came a subchapter S corporation, it would unwittingly eliminate those important potential
sources of new equity. Conversely, the LLC has no such restriction.
197. I.R.C. § 45D(b)(1)(C) (West 2007); 26 C.ER. § 1.45D-l(c)(4)(A)(2007).
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may have opportunity advantages in Chinatown. If the overwhelming
motivation of the CDE is to maximize a return on the investment, the
lack of additional tax credits may kill the transfer. But Ethnivestors or
those otherwise engaging in social entrepreneurship with a long term
commitment beyond the financial return are more likely to see a benefit
beyond the short term financial returns and have an ear to the ground for
investment opportunities, either upon the initial allocation, or on a reallo-
cation from the Treasury.
African Americans within the core cities have ethnic enclaves, a
clustering of businesses. It is certainly conceivable that, like Miami entre-
preneurs of Cuban descent, an Ethnivestor-based CDE and QCB team
could develop strategic plans that evidence vertical and horizontal inte-
gration, using culturally aligned suppliers and consumers and pooled
savings, cross-pollinating markets where related markets become co-
referral sources. There is also no prohibition in the NMTC statue or
Regulations against rotating credit associations akin to those used in other
ethnic enclave economies in this country.
E. Empirical Ethnographic Design Modeling
Though beyond its scope, this Article urges scientific testing of the
Ethnivestor model. Ethnography is a scientific approach to discovering
what people actually do, what role, if any, culture and ethnicity play in
those actions, and the reasons for those actions before interpretations are
drawn from our professional or academic discipline.9 Commonly used
Ethnography research methods include data collection through focus
group interviews, audio and video recordings, and elicitation tech-
niques.' 99 Definitions on such terms as culture and ethnicity should be
clarified.2  The inquiries could for example survey two groups of African
Americans: one group that fits the proposed profile of an Ethnivestor and
another group that does not. The questions would be designed to reveal
the likelihood of investing in what is proposed as Properly Purposed Pro-
jects. If those fitting the Ethnivestor profile have a highly correlated
answer to match the projected investment behaviors in Properly Purposed
Projects then the results are indicative of the model's validity. If, on the
other hand, the non-Ethnivestor profiles show a propensity for investing
in those same Properly Purposed Projects, then the results indicate that
the Ethnivestor model is flawed.
198. LECOMPTh, supra note 8, at 1.
199. Id. at 127.
200. See id. at 24. The accepted definition of ethnicity for this Article is "self-
identification in a sociopolitical grouping that has both recognized public identity and a
conservationist/actvist orientation." Id.
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Criterion should include what the would-be investor considers her
opportunity costs and the value of the ethnic group relative to regulator
influences. Data can also be collected through interviews or hypothetical
examinations from developers to determine the point at which the inves-
tor considered the opportunity costs to be greater than the utility of the
investment. Groups of target residents that are part of communities af-
fected by NMTC projects could also be examined to ascertain whether
the projects added to their quality of life. That may provide a basis of
comparison for the small business model in the Ethnivestor construct to
test the notion of a modern day ethnic enclave economy. Have the Prop-
erly Purposed Projects already provided empirical evidence that target
residents are indeed co-ethnically employed where the Ethnivestor-based
employer operates a defacto school of entrepreneurship? Are target resi-
dents experiencing an enhanced well being from ethnic role models that
passes along positive modeling for their offspring? Can a body of evi-
dence be developed on the rate of decrease in the target resident's
dependence on public funds under the Ethnivestor and gentrifier models?
These are but a few of the questions that should be part of any larger eth-
nography study.
CONCLUSION
The NMTC program has laudable goals of providing federally
funded subsidies as incentives for equity investments to assist targeted low
income residents and their communities. The process has been co-opted
in part by those who prefer to benefit wealthy persons who come into
the low income communities rather than benefiting the low income resi-
dents of those communities. Unintended loopholes have morphed
Properly Purposed Projects into problematic opportunities for opera
houses, convention centers, and high priced condominiums, in two words:
subsidized gentrification.
But this Article does not merely highlight federal government fail-
ures. Instead it offers an alternative vision of what can be-greater
support from the private sector to play a greater role in solving the urban
crisis through a carefully configured substrata of the African American
middle class of Ethnivestors. I hope seeds have been planted for future
self-help techniques from a group of Ethnivestors that both uses its cul-
tural connectivity to an ethnic enclave as an asset not a demerit, and
learns from the entrepreneurship of its prior generations. These Eth-
nivestors can also learn from other immigrants groups who also faced
hostility and exclusion, and who nonetheless formed vertically and hori-
zontally hyper-efficient ethnic economies, armed with rotating credit
unions and, most importantly, a trusting nurturing role within their re-
spective small businesses for its otherwise marginalized co-ethnics. These
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Ethnivestors can in turn help redirect bilions of federal tax dollars to the
intended beneficiaries.
There are several challenges to an Ethnivestor-modeled transforma-
tive self-help strategy. Unlike the Middlemen of the past among other
ethnic and religious groups, there is no forced source for self-help. Can
the Ethnivestor rekindle the self-help investment strategy on its own voli-
tion? Stated differently, is the lure of individual gain or are the financial
insecurities derived from inexperience or prior failed experiences, too
strong an influence compared to the social entrepreneurial goals to en-
courage investment in the ethnic enclave economy? Without amendments
to the current NMTC legislation as proposed above, I doubt it.Without a
collective vision of a relative few groups that culturally connects with the
target communities, I doubt it.Yet there is hope and opportunity-hope
because there is a pool of potential Ethnivestors with capable resources,
and opportunity because the NMTC legislation provides the proper
statutory goal, and with some tweaking, an accessible regulatory frame-
work.
